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Abstract
Wemeasure the "new" gains from trade reaped by Canada as a result of the Canada-US
Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). We think of the "new" gains from trade of a country
as all welfare e¤ects pertaining to changes in the set of rms serving that country as
emphasized in the so-called "new" trade literature. To this end, we rst develop an exact
decomposition of the gains from trade which separates "traditional" and "new" gains. We
then apply this decomposition using Canadian and US micro data and nd that the "new"
welfare e¤ects of CUSFTA on Canada were negative.
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1 Introduction
The prevailing view in the empirical trade literature is that the rm selection e¤ects associated
with trade liberalization contribute positively to the gains from trade. In particular, this
literature emphasizes that trade liberalization allows additional foreign rms to enter into
exporting thereby expanding the range of varieties available to domestic consumers. Moreover,
it highlights that trade liberalization forces weaker domestic rms to exit out of production
thereby increasing the average productivity of domestic rms. Inuential examples include
Broda and Weinsteins (2006) measurement of import variety gains for the US and Treers
(2004) estimation of domestic productivity gains for Canada.
The main point of our paper is that this view is incomplete. We make this point by
deriving an exact decomposition of the gains from trade in a generalized Melitz (2003) model
into "traditional" gains and "new" gains, where the "new" gains capture selection-induced
variety and productivity e¤ects. Our decomposition reveals that the "new" gains consist
of gains from foreign entry into exporting and losses from domestic exit out of production.
Empirically, these two e¤ects can be measured as functions of the market shares of entering
and exiting rms. These market shares can be high because many rms enter and exit or
because these rms have high productivities so that they capture variety and productivity
e¤ects.
This then implies that the key part missing from the empirical literature is simply that
domestic exit is associated with a welfare loss. Studies such as Broda and Weinstein (2006)
abstract entirely from domestic exit and measure only the welfare gains from foreign entry into
exporting. Studies such as Treer (2004) focus on domestic exit but measure only the e¤ects
this has on average productivity. However, these productivity calculations ignore that losing
low productivity rms is still welfare reducing just less so than losing high productivity ones.
Overall, this literature therefore delivers a biased account of the welfare e¤ects of selection by
emphasizing only selection gains.
We apply our decomposition to measure the "new" gains from trade reaped by Canada as
a result of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). We start with a simple before-
and-after analysis at the aggregate level and then turn to a di¤erences-in-di¤erences analysis
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at the industry-level which allows us to control for contemporaneous shocks to Canada. Our
main nding is that Canada actually su¤ered from "new" welfare losses since it gained less
from US entry into exporting than it lost from Canadian exit out of production. These losses
accumulate to -1.52% of Canadas real income over our 8-year CUSFTA period between 1988
and 1996.1
While the "new" gains from trade are ultimately determined by the market shares of
entering and exiting rms, we can still decompose them into domestic variety, domestic pro-
ductivity, import variety, and import productivity e¤ects. Our methodology allows us to do
so in a fully theory-consistent manner thereby sidestepping some serious problems the trade
and productivity literature has faced. For example, a common approach is to measure rm
productivity as revenue per worker which is inaccurate in Melitz (2003) type environments.
This is simply because more productive rms also charge lower prices so that variation in
revenue per worker understates variation in rm productivity.
Our methodology builds on the seminal work of Feenstra (1994) which shows how to ac-
count for new goods when calculating changes in CES price indices. We extend this work
into a full-edged decomposition of the gains from trade based on a generalized Melitz (2003)
model separating out "traditional" and "new", domestic and foreign, and variety and produc-
tivity e¤ects. Feenstra (2010) himself has also used his method to provide a decomposition of
the gains from trade in the special case of Melitz (2003) with Pareto distributed productivities
and we will discuss in detail how his decomposition di¤ers from ours once we have developed
our approach more formally.
We ask a di¤erent question than the recent Arkolakis et al (2012) gains from trade lit-
erature.2 In particular, we are less interested in a quantication of the overall gains from
trade but more in a decomposition of the gains from trade with a particular focus on exactly
identifying the "new" gains from trade. As a result, we are also not attempting to compare
the gains from trade across models but instead develop a decomposition taking as given one
model, specically a generalized version of Melitz (2003) which does not impose the restric-
1See Head and Ries (1999), Treer (2004), Breinlich (2008), Lileeva (2008), Lileeva and Treer (2010),
Melitz and Treer (2012), and Breinlich and Cunat (forthcoming) for earlier empirical analyses of CUSFTA.
2Other contributions to this literature include Arkolakis et al (2008), Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Melitz
and Redding (2015), and Ossa (2015).
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tions on entry into production and exporting and the distribution of rm productivities used
by Arkolakis et al (2012).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our
methodology by developing our general heterogeneous rm model, describing our decomposi-
tion of welfare changes into "traditional" gains from trade and "new" gains from trade, and
linking our decomposition to su¢ cient statistics that can be tabulated from micro data. In the
third section, we then turn to our application to CUSFTA by discussing our data, describing
our aggregate ndings, and presenting our industry-level results which also include the results
obtained from our di¤erences-in-di¤erences analysis. A nal section then draws conclusions
and summarizes our main results.
2 Methodology
2.1 Basic framework
We introduce our methodology using a generic heterogeneous rm model of trade. Consumers
have constant elasticity of substitution preferences over di¤erentiated varieties sourced from
many countries. These varieties are produced by monopolistic rms with heterogeneous pro-
ductivities at constant marginal costs using labor only and trade is subject to iceberg costs.
We remain agnostic about the determinants of entry into production and exporting and sim-
ply say that Mij rms from country i serve country j. Hence, there may or may not be xed
market access costs and rms may or may not sort into production and exporting according
to productivity cuto¤s.
In this environment, a country i rm with productivity ' faces a demand qij (') =
pij(')
 
P 1 j
Yj in country j, where pij is the delivered price in country j, Pj is the price in-
dex in country j, Yj is the income in country j, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution.
As a result, it adopts a constant markup pricing rule pij (') =  1
wi ij
' , where wi is the
wage rate in country i and  ij > 1 are the iceberg trade costs. This implies that the value
of bilateral trade ows can be written as Xij =
R
'2ijMij


 1
wi ij
'Pj
1 
YjdGi ('j' 2 ij),
where ij is the set of productivities corresponding to all country i rms serving country j
and Gi ('j' 2 ij) is their cumulative distribution.
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These bilateral trade ows can be rewritten as Xij =Mij


 1
wi ij
~'ijPj
1 
Yj , where ~'ij =R
'2ij '
 1dGi ('j' 2 ij)
 1
 1
is the Melitz (2003) measure of average productivity. Hence,
they can be thought of as depending on average prices, Xij =Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj , where average
prices depend on average productivity, ~pij =  1
wi ij
~'ij
. As will become clear shortly, the rela-
tionships Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj and ~pij / wi ij~'ij are all we need to derive our decomposition
of price index changes. Our decomposition of welfare changes then follows from this decompo-
sition of price index changes and the additional assumption that total income is proportional
to labor income Yj / wjLj .
Overall, our methodology therefore applies to all models satisfying Xij /Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj ,
~pij / wi ij~'ij , and Yj / wjLj . An important special case is the standard Melitz (2003) model
in which free entry ensures that Yj / wjLj trivially. While we maintain the CES assumption
Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj throughout our analysis, we explore how our approach has to be
modied if either of the other two relationships break. In particular, we consider a version
with endogenous markups in which average prices are not proportional to average marginal
costs. Moreover, we consider a version with tari¤ revenues in which total income is not
proportional to labor income.
2.2 Welfare decomposition
In this environment, welfare is given by real per-capita income so that log changes in welfare
can be written as ln
W 0j
Wj
= ln
Y 0j =L
0
j
Yj=Lj
  ln P
0
j
Pj
. Our rst assumption, Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj ,
immediately implies ln
P 0j
Pj
= ln
~p0ij
~pij
  1 1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
+ 1 1 ln
0ij
ij
, where ij =
Xij
Yj
are expen-
diture shares. Summing up over all source countries using the Sato (1976)-Vartia (1976)
weights ij =


0
ij ij
ln
0
ij lnij

=
PN
m=1

0
mj mj
ln
0
mj lnmj

, the last term cancels so that ln
P 0j
Pj
=PN
i=1
ij

ln
~p0ij
~pij
  1 1 ln
M 0ij
Mij

. This simply captures that changes in the price index are ex-
penditure share weighted averages of changes in average prices and elasticity of substitution
adjusted changes in available variety.
Our second assumption, ~pij / wi ij~'ij , allows us to write changes in average prices in
terms of changes in wages, changes in trade costs, and changes in average productivity,
ln
~p0ij
~pij
= ln
w0i
wi
+ ln
 0ij
 ij
  ln ~'
0
ij
~'ij
. To make explicit that ~'ij can change because of changes
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in the average productivity of continuing rms or because of changes in the composition
of rms, we separately dene the average productivity of continuing rms ~'cij and expand
ln
~'0ij
~'ij
= ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
+

ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

so that ln
~p0ij
~pij
= ln
w0i
wi
+ ln
 0ij
 ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
 

ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

. To
be clear, ~'cij is dened analogously to ~'ij as ~'
c
ij =
R
'2cij '
 1dGi

'j' 2 cij
 1
 1
so that
~'cij changes only if the productivities of continuing rms change.
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Together, our rst two assumptions therefore allow us to decompose price index changes as
ln
P 0j
Pj
=
PN
i=1
ij

ln
 0ij
 ij
+ ln
w0i
wi
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

 PNi=1 ij  1 1 ln M 0ijMij + ln ~'0ij~'ij   ln ~'c0ij~'cij . Notice
that the rst term,
PN
i=1
ij

ln
 0ij
 ij
+ ln
w0i
wi
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

, captures changes in the average prices
charged by continuing rms while the second term,
PN
i=1
ij

1
 1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
+

ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

,
captures adjustments in available variety and average productivity due to the entry and exit
of rms. Upon recalling that welfare changes are given by ln
W 0j
Wj
= ln
Y 0j =L
0
j
Yj=Lj
  ln P
0
j
Pj
, our welfare
decomposition follows immediately from this once we impose our third assumption Yj / wjLj
which implies ln
Y 0j =L
0
j
Yj=Lj
= ln
w0j
wj
so that:
ln
W 0j
Wj
=
NX
i=1
ij
 
  ln 
0
ij
 ij
+

ln
w0j
wj
  ln w
0
i
wi

+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
!
| {z }
"traditional" gains from trade
(1)
+
NX
i=1
ij
 
1
   1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
+
 
ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
!!
| {z }
"new" gains from trade
This formula provides an exact decomposition of the welfare e¤ects of arbitrary shocks
in any environment satisfying Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj , ~pij / wi ij~'ij , and Yj / wjLj . Since we
are interested in understanding the welfare e¤ects of trade liberalization, we have labelled the
two terms according to the gains from trade they describe. In a nutshell, the "traditional"
gains capture what would be the only gains if all rms were continuing rms while the "new"
gains describe the additional gains due to changes in the set of rms serving country j. Notice
that these gains might come from reductions in variable or xed trade costs even though xed
trade costs do not feature explicitly in the formula.
3 In our application, continuing rms correspond to rms which have neither exited nor entered as a result
of trade liberalization. It can be shown that ln
~'c
0
ij
~'cij
is just a weighted average of the productivity changes
of continuing rms with the weights being Sato-Vartia weights dened over the market shares of individual
continuing rms among all continuing rms from country i serving country j.
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For concreteness, let us elaborate on our decomposition by considering the welfare e¤ects
of CUSFTA on the Canadian economy. The rst term, ln
 0ij
 ij
, simply describes that trade
liberalization makes US varieties cheaper in Canada thereby bringing about consumption
gains. The second term, ln
w0j
wj
  ln w0iwi , adds that the terms-of-trade can also adjust as a result
of relative wage changes thereby redistributing some of these gains.4 The third term, ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
,
accounts for within-rm productivity changes among continuing US and Canadian rms which
combine with the changes in trade costs and wages to determine the changes in the prices
charged by these rms.
We label these terms "traditional" gains since they also appear in traditional compara-
tive advantage models of trade. However, we can already anticipate that they generally do
not capture all welfare e¤ects of trade liberalization in such models simply because we have
so far only allowed for intra-industry trade. We will revisit this issue when we turn to our
multi-industry extension and show that our methodology can be easily extended to also com-
prehensively capture Ricardian gains from trade. Strictly speaking, the term ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
should
probably be in its own category since neither "traditional" nor "new" trade models typically
emphasize within-rm productivity e¤ects.5
Let us now return to our CUSFTA example and consider the likely "new" gains from
trade driven by changes in the set of rms serving the Canadian market. On the one hand,
one would expect the improved access to the Canadian market to induce additional US rms
to start exporting to Canada which would bring about a variety gain 1 1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
. However,
these new US exporters are likely to be less productive than the average US exporter given
that they did not choose to export originally which would be captured by a productivity loss
ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
. Recall that we separately account for the productivity changes of continuing
rms so that the terms ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
always capture pure selection e¤ects.
On the other hand, one would expect the tougher competition from US rms to force some
4This relative wage term has a zero sum character globally which is particularly easy to see in the special
case of small shocks. Specically, it is immediately clear that
PN
j=1
Yj
YW
PN
i=1 ij

dwj
wj
  dwi
wi

= 0, where
YW =
PN
j=1 Yj is world income since equilibrium requires that Yj =
P
mXmj and Yj =
P
nXjn. As a result,
relative wage e¤ects are fundamentally about the distribution of the gains from trade and not their overall size.
5An important exception are multi-product rm models such as Bernard et al (2011) which feature within-
rm productivity e¤ects as a result of product-level selection. As we will see shortly, our methodology can
capture such e¤ects.
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Canadian rms out of the Canadian market which would bring about a variety loss 1 1 ln
M 0jj
Mjj
.
However, these rms are likely to be less productive than the average Canadian rm so there
would be a counterbalancing productivity gain ln
~'0jj
~'jj
  ln ~'
c0
jj
~'cjj
. Notice that these productivity
adjustments simply capture that the US and Canadian rms which enter and exit into serving
the Canadian market o¤er their varieties for relatively high prices as a result of their relatively
low productivity. This makes them relatively unattractive to Canadian consumers compared
to the average US and Canadian rms.
An important implication of this intuition which we will conrm more formally below
is that the productivity adjustments can only ever have a modulating character and never
overturn the underlying variety e¤ects. In particular, Canadian consumers always gain from
additional US varieties no matter how unproductive the new US exporters are. Similarly,
Canadian consumers always lose from disappearing Canadian varieties no matter how unpro-
ductive the exiting Canadian rms are. At the most basic level, this just reects the fact that
consumers value any variety in a di¤erentiated goods environment as long as it is available
for purchase at a nite price.
This means that if there are positive "new" gains from trade in this environment they
should be associated with the entry of foreign rms into exporting and not with the exit of
domestic rms out of production. While this might seem obvious in light of our discussion, it
contradicts the standard narrative presented in the heterogeneous rm literature. In particu-
lar, it is usually emphasized that trade liberalization increases average productivity by causing
the least productive rms to shut down. While this is true, it just means that consumers lose
less from the reduction in the number of domestic varieties than they would if instead the
average rm shut down.
In all of this, it is important to remember that our statements are conditional on our three
assumptions Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj , ~pij / wi ij~'ij , and Yj / wjLj . Hence, when we say that
Canadian consumers always gain from additional US varieties and always lose from disap-
pearing Canadian varieties this is conditional on prices remaining proportional to marginal
costs and income remaining proportional to labor income. Essentially, this means that we
consider general equilibrium adjustments of the kind captured in the Melitz (2003) model and
not partial adjustments which violate our equilibrium conditions, for example, by a¤ecting
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prots disproportionately to labor income.
It is sometimes observed that trade liberalization not only increases domestic productivity
by forcing the least productive rms to exit but also by reallocating resources from less to
more productive continuing rms. While one might suspect that such reallocations are also
part of the "new" gains, they actually show up as terms-of-trade e¤ects in the "traditional"
gains. To see this, notice that they do not change the purchasing power of domestic wages
in terms of domestic goods since rms charge constant markups over marginal costs. Hence,
they can only change the purchasing power of domestic wages in terms of foreign goods which
happens only if they a¤ect domestic wages relative to foreign wages.
An interesting special case of our framework is the Melitz (2003) model with Pareto
distributed productivities considered by Arkolakis et al (2008). As we show in the appendix,
it implies that
PN
i=1
ij
 1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
= 0 and
PN
i=1
ij

ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

= 0 following trade cost
reductions so that there are then no "new" gains from trade. In our CUSFTA example, this
would imply that the increased availability of US varieties would be exactly o¤set by the
decreased availability of Canadian varieties in welfare terms. Similarly, the increase in the
average productivity of Canadian rms would be exactly o¤set by the decrease in the average
productivity of US exporters in welfare terms.6
Feenstra (2010) has shown that in this special case it is also true that ln
W 0j
Wj
= ln
~'0jj
~'jj
. While
it is tempting to conclude from this that domestic productivity gains are the only source of
welfare gains, it is easy to verify that ln
~'0jj
~'jj
=
PN
i=1
ij

  ln 
0
ij
 ij
+

ln
w0j
wj
  ln w0iwi

+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij

.
Hence, ln
~'0jj
~'jj
is simply a su¢ cient statistic for what we call the "traditional" gains which
would also appear in a version of our model without rm heterogeneity. For example, the
term  PNi=1 ij ln  0ij ij simply captures the direct e¤ect trade cost reductions have on the
domestic price index which then brings about a number of endogenous adjustments including
domestic selection e¤ects among heterogeneous rms.7
6Atkeson and Burstein (2010) show that the "indirect e¤ect" of small trade cost reductions is zero in a
symmetric two-country Melitz (2003) model even without imposing Pareto because of a combination of free
entry and optimal selection. What they refer to as "indirect e¤ect" in their welfare decomposition corresponds
to what we call "new gains from trade".
7As explained earlier, our decomposition (1) is valid for any shock hitting the economy and not just for
changes in variable trade costs. However, our above discussion of the Melitz-Pareto model implicitly restricts
attention to changes in variable trade costs. As will be clear from the appendix, a reduction in xed trade
costs or an increase in the trading partners labor force can still bring about "new" gains even in this special
case.
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Melitz and Redding (2015) have recently shown that, conditional on initial trade shares and
structural parameters, the gains from trade are larger in the Arkolakis et al (2008) version of
Melitz (2003) then in the Krugman (1980) version of Melitz (2003). This might seem puzzling
in light of our decomposition which would in both cases indicate zero "new" gains from trade.
The explanation is simply that the Sato-Vartia import expenditure shares ij are also larger
in the Arkolakis et al (2008) version of Melitz (2003) since it features additional extensive
margin e¤ects. We will discuss the broader point of whether extensive margin e¤ects should
be included in our denition of ij further below.
2.3 Su¢ cient statistics
Against this background, it becomes clear that standard approaches to estimating the "new"
gains from trade tend to capture only partial e¤ects. In particular, existing studies estimating
the variety gains from trade typically focus on the increase in the number of imported varieties
but downplay the fall in the number of domestically produced varieties (see, for example,
Broda and Weinstein, 2006). Similarly, available studies estimating the productivity gains
from trade usually emphasize the increase in the average productivity of domestic rms but
do not account for the decrease in the average productivity of foreign rms (see, for example,
Treer, 2004).
We estimate the "new" gains from trade by expressing them in terms of simple su¢ cient
statistics which also follow from our assumptions Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj and ~pij / wi ij~'ij .
In particular, we consider the total sales from country i to country j associated with only
continuing rms, Xcij /M cij

wi ij
~'cij
1
Pj
1 
Yj , and express them as a fraction of the total sales
from country i to country j associated with all rms, Xij /Mij

wi ij
~'ij
1
Pj
1 
Yj , which yields
Xcij
Xij
=
Mcij
Mij

~'cij
~'ij
 1
. Upon taking changes and using the fact that the number of continuing
rms does not change by denition, we obtain our basic measurement equation for the "new"
gains from trade,
1
   1 ln
 
Xcij=Xij
Xc
0
ij=X
0
ij
!
=
1
   1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
+
 
ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
!
(2)
Hence, all we need to quantify the "new" gains from trade reaped by country j is informa-
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tion on the change in the market shares of continuing rms serving market j. These simple
su¢ cient statistics are easily measurable using micro data and capture the overall welfare
e¤ects of entry and exit taking into account rm productivities. For example, if the domestic
market share of continuing Canadian rms rises following CUSFTA, this indicates that do-
mestic exit was more important than domestic entry in the Canadian market, either because
more rms exited than entered or because the exiting rms were more productive than the
entering rms.
This intuition can be seen even more clearly by further decomposing the su¢ cient statistic
1
 1 ln

Xcij=Xij
Xc
0
ij =X
0
ij

which will also be useful in its own right. In particular, we can separate
trade ows into their extensive and intensive margins by dening average revenues ~rij /
wi ij
~'ij
1
Pj
1 
Yj and writing Xij / Mij~rij . Of course, we can do this for all subsets of rms
and time periods so that also Xcij /M cij~rcij , X 0ij /M 0ij~r0ij , and Xc
0
ij /M cij~rc
0
ij . As a result, we
can write 1 1 ln

Xcij=Xij
Xc
0
ij =X
0
ij

as a log di¤erences-in-di¤erences equation in the number of rms
and their average revenues comparing continuing rms to all rms in the pre-period and the
post-period,
1
   1 ln
 
Xcij=Xij
Xc
0
ij=X
0
ij
!
| {z }
overall "new" gains
=
1
   1 ln
M cij
Mij
variety loss
+
1
   1 ln
~rcij
~rij
prod. gain| {z }
loss from exit
  1
   1 ln
M cij
M 0ij
variety gain
  1
   1 ln
~rc
0
ij
~r0ij
prod. loss| {z }
gain from entry
(3)
The term 1 1 ln
Mcij
Mij
= 1 1 ln

1  M
ex
ij
Mij

represents the variety loss from exit since all
rms in the pre-period can be separated into continuing or exiting rms, Mij = M cij +M
ex
ij .
Similarly, the term   1 1 ln
Mcij
M 0ij
=   1 1 ln

1  M
en0
ij
M 0ij

summarizes the variety gain from
entry since all rms in the post-period can be separated into continuing or entering rms,
M 0ij = M
c
ij + M
en0
ij . The revenue ratios simply capture the associated e¤ects on average
productivity. In particular, the term 1 1 ln
~rcij
~rij
= ln
~'cij
~'ij
measures the productivity change
due to exit which one would expect to be positive. Similarly, the term   1 1 ln
~rc
0
ij
~r0ij
=   ln ~'
c0
ij
~'0ij
describes the productivity change due to entry which one would expect to be negative.
Notice that our measurement of the e¤ects of selection on average productivity is quite
di¤erent from what is usually done in the literature. In particular, the standard approach is
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based on obtaining measures of productivity levels either by simply computing real output per
worker such as Treer (2004) or by leveraging more complex techniques from the industrial
organization literature such as Pavcnik (2002). In contrast, we do not compute productivity
levels at all but instead infer the e¤ects selection has on average productivity by comparing
the average revenues of continuing rms to the average revenues of all rms within a given
time period as suggested by our theory.8
We can now also conrm our earlier intuition that productivity changes only ever have
a modulating character and never overturn the underlying variety e¤ects. In particular, the
term labelled "loss from exit" just corresponds to ln
Xcij
Xij
which is negative if there is exit
because then Xcij < Xij . Similarly, the term labelled "gain from entry" is simply   ln
Xc
0
ij
X0ij
which is positive if there is entry because then Xc
0
ij > X
0
ij . At the same time, it is important to
note that net variety gains are still not necessarily associated with net welfare gains. This is
simply because the magnitude of the welfare loss from exit and the magnitude of the welfare
gain from entry also depend on the average productivities of the a¤ected rms.
While equations (2) and (3) allow us to compute and decompose the "new" gains from
trade, it is also straightforward to calculate the overall and "traditional" gains from trade,
at least up to domestic within-rm productivity e¤ects. In particular, the overall gains are
given by ln
W 0j
Wj
=   1 1 ln
0jj
jj
+ 1 1 ln
M 0jj
Mjj
+ ln
~'0jj
~'jj
since ln
0ij
ij
  ln 
0
jj
jj
= ln
M 0ij
Mij
  ln M
0
jj
Mjj
+
(1  )

ln
 0ij
 ij
+ ln
w0i
wi
  ln w
0
j
wj
  ln ~'
0
ij
~'ij
+ ln
~'0jj
~'jj

so that the "traditional" gains can then be
computed as a residual. The only complication is that ln
~'0jj
~'jj
is not directly observable and
that our earlier logic to recover it only returns changes in average productivity net of within-
rm e¤ects, ln
~'0jj
~'jj
  ln ~'
c0
jj
~'cjj
= 1 1

ln
~rcjj
~rjj
  ln ~r
c0
jj
~r0jj

.9
Our formulas for the "new" gains from trade can be roughly thought of as decomposi-
tions of the "Feenstra-Ratio" which is widely used to adjust changes in the price index for
new product varieties. In particular, one can show that Feenstras (1994) original method
8Notice that we implicitly use the productivity growth of continuing rms as a benchmark when calculating
the e¤ects of entry and exit on average productivity. For example, by inferring the productivity consequences
of exit from relative revenues before exit occurs, we assume that the productivity of exiting rms would have
grown as fast as the productivity of continuing rms had they not exited.
9Hence, when we measure the "traditional" gains as a residual, we really measurePN
i=1
ij

  ln 
0
ij
ij
  ln w0i
wi
+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij

  ln ~'
c0
jj
~'cjj
instead of
PN
i=1
ij

  ln 
0
ij
ij
  ln w0i
wi
+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij

, thereby not
fully accounting for within-rm productivity e¤ects.
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yields ln
W 0j
Wj
=
PN
i=1

c
ij

  ln 
0
ij
 ij
+

ln
w0j
wj
  ln w0iwi

+ ln
~'c
0
ij
~'cij

+ 1 1 ln

Y cj =Yj
Y c
0
j =Y
0
j

in our en-
vironment, where the last term represents the "Feenstra-Ratio". As can be seen, this is
closely related to our decompositions ln
W 0j
Wj
=
PN
i=1
ij

  ln 
0
ij
 ij
+

ln
w0j
wj
  ln w0iwi

+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij

+
1
 1
PN
i=1
ij ln

Xcij=Xij
Xc
0
ij =X
0
ij

as well as ln
W 0j
Wj
=
PN
i=1
ij

  ln 
0
ij
 ij
+

ln
w0j
wj
  ln w0iwi

+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij

+
1
 1
PN
i=1
ij

ln
Mcij
Mij
+ ln
~rcij
~rij
  ln M
c
ij
M 0ij
  ln ~r
c0
ij
~r0ij

implied by equations (1) - (3).
We say "roughly" because our welfare decompositions and their Feenstra (1994) analog
are not exactly the same. In particular, we work with Sato-Vartia weights calculated using
shipments of all rms, ij , so that our "traditional" gains capture what would be the only
gains if all rms were continuing rms and import shares were the same as they are in the
data for all rms. In contrast, the Feenstra (1994) analog applies Sato-Vartia weights using
the shipments of all continuing rms, cij , so that its "traditional" gains capture what would
be the only gains if all rms were continuing rms and import shares were the same as they
are in the data for all continuing rms.
Conceptually, this implies that part of the gains captured by the Feenstra-Ratio show up
in our "traditional" gains. For example, we attribute the price-reducing e¤ects of tari¤ cuts to
our "traditional" gains even if they apply to newly available varieties which makes sense given
that our "new" gains are meant to isolate variety and productivity e¤ects.10 However, we will
see that this di¤erence is not crucial for our main result that the "new" gains from CUSFTA
reaped by Canada are negative. In particular, this result is robust to using the Feenstra-
Ratio as an alternative measure of the "new" gains as long as it is accurately computed using
Canadian expenditure on Canadian and US varieties.
Our nding that the "new" gains remain negative using this alternative decomposition
should also address concerns that our preferred Sato-Vartia weights ij confound intensive
and extensive margin e¤ects. For example, one might argue that we should not use ij
when calculating the "traditional" gains since it also includes foreign entry into exporting
which should be part of the "new" gains. However, we have seen earlier that the alternative
10This can be seen more formally by separating the Feenstra-Ratio into our "new"
gains from trade term and an adjustment term, 1
 1 ln
Y cj =Yj
Y c
0
j =Y
0
j
=
PN
i=1
ij
1
 1 ln
Xcij=Xij
Xc
0
ij =X
0
ij
+PN
i=1
 
ij   cij
   ln  0ij
ij
+

ln
w0j
wj
  ln w0i
wi

+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij

, which follows straightforwardly from the above
decompositions. The adjustment term gives the portion of the Feenstra-Ratio which we attribute to the
"traditional" gains and essentially captures "traditional" forces acting on new rms.
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decomposition in which the Feenstra-Ratio captures the "new" gains also uses cij to calculate
the "traditional" gains so that our negative "new" gains result is robust to limiting these
trade shares to continuing rms.
2.4 Extensions
Before taking our methodology to the data, we consider a number of extensions to explore the
robustness of our approach to departures from the assumptions we have so far imposed. In
particular, we consider versions with nontraded and intermediate goods, endogenous markups,
tari¤ revenues, multiproduct rms, and heterogeneous quality. However, we continue to limit
ourselves to one-sector models for now and postpone a discussion of multi-sector versions to
when we introduce our di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach later on. In the interest of brevity,
we relegate detailed derivations to the appendix and only provide an intuitive discussion of
the central insights in the main text.
2.4.1 Nontraded and intermediate goods
We introduce nontraded and intermediate goods as in Alvarez and Lucas (2007) by assuming
that consumers spend a share 1   j of their income on nontraded goods, rms spend a
fraction 1  j of their costs on intermediate goods, rms aggregate varieties into goods just
like consumers, and nontraded goods are produced under perfect competition and constant
returns. In the appendix, we show that we can then still apply equations (1) - (3) with
the only di¤erence that decomposition (1) has to be scaled by the factor
j
j
. Intuitively,
nontraded goods dampen the gains from trade because they make trade less important while
intermediate goods magnify the gains from trade because they allow rms to benet from
lower input costs.
In the presence of intermediate goods, the interpretation of decomposition (1) also has to
be broadened in the sense that it then combines direct and indirect e¤ects. For example, a
"traditional" fall in trade costs or a "new" increase in import variety then not only benets
consumers directly but also indirectly because rms charge lower prices as a result of reduced
input costs. Mechanically, these indirect gains then also show up as labor productivity gains
even if the fundamental rm productivities ' remain unchanged. This is simply because rms
14
can produce more output per worker if they have access to cheaper or more intermediate
goods.
2.4.2 Endogenous markups
We allow for endogenous markups in our CES environment by assuming that there is a discrete
number of rms instead of a continuum of rms so that rms take the price index e¤ects of
their pricing decisions into account. The implication of this is that more productive rms also
charge higher markups since they face lower demand elasticities due to their larger market
shares. In the appendix, we show that equations (1) - (3) then still remain valid as long as
we reinterpret the average productivity terms in decomposition (1). In particular, they then
no longer only capture average productivity e¤ects in isolation but a combination of average
productivity and average markup e¤ects.
This reinterpretation applies to the selection e¤ects as well as the within-rm productivity
e¤ects. In the extended model, the term
PN
i=1
ij

ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

captures that entry and
exit change average prices not only because the entering and exiting rms have di¤erent pro-
ductivities but also because they charge di¤erent markups. Similarly, the term
PN
i=1
ij ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
captures that productivity growth among continuing rms not only changes average prices
by a¤ecting marginal costs but also by a¤ecting markups. Consumers are indi¤erent about
whether average prices change because of changes in average productivity or the average
markup as long as Yj / wjLj .
2.4.3 Tari¤ revenue
In the appendix, we show that we can still apply equations (1) - (3) if we allow for tari¤ revenue
Rj as long as we add the term ln
1+

Rj
wjLj
0
1+

Rj
wjLj
 to decomposition (1). We allocate this term to the
"traditional" gains from trade since it would also appear in traditional comparative advantage
models. Caliendo et al (2015) have recently argued that there is more entry in response to
trade liberalization in a Melitz (2003) model with tari¤ revenue. While this may be, we do
not have to take a stance on this issue since we decompose the observed response to CUSFTA
through the lens of a model which remains agnostic about the determinants of entry into
15
production and exporting.11
2.4.4 Multi-product rms
We introduce multi-product rms following a simplied version of Bernard et al (2011). In
particular, we maintain our earlier assumption that utility is a CES aggregate over a contin-
uum of varieties and add that each variety is now also a CES aggregate over a continuum of
products. We impose the same elasticity of substitution between and within varieties so that
multi-product rms act as if they were a collection of independent single-product rms. Just
as we remain agnostic about the selection of rms into markets, we also remain agnostic about
the selection of products into rms and simply assume that country i rm making variety !
sells Kij! products to country j.
In the appendix, we show that there are then two versions of equations (1) - (3), the
original one which can be implemented using rm-level data and an additional one which can
be implemented using product-level data. The additional one further decomposes changes
in the average productivity of continuing rms into changes in the average productivity of
continuing products and the variety and average productivity e¤ects associated with the entry
and exit of products. Essentially, there are then not only rm-level "new" gains from trade but
also product-level "new" gains from trade which can both be identied with our methodology
given su¢ cient data.
Unfortunately, we are not able to apply this extended decomposition in our CUSFTA
analysis since we do not have access to product-level Canadian data. As a result, we are not
able to identify any product-level "new" gains from trade and implicitly subsume them under
the term ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
in the "traditional" gains from trade. Notice, however, that the resulting bias
has an ambiguous sign since the product-level "new" gains are driven by the same opposing
forces as the rm-level "new" gains. In particular, CUSFTA is likely to give Canadian con-
sumers access to more and on average less productive US products but less and on average
11Along the same lines, we can still apply equations (1) - (3) if we allow for arbitrary prots j as long as
we add the term ln
1+

j
wjLj
0
1+

j
wjLj
 to decomposition (1). However, changes in prots are much harder to reliably
measure so that we maintain our implicit assumption j / wjLj throughout (recall that this is trivially
satised in the standard case of free entry).
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more productive Canadian products from continuing rms.
2.4.5 Heterogeneous quality
We introduce heterogeneous quality by allowing for preference shifters in the utility function.
In the appendix, we show that equations (1) - (3) then still remain valid as long as we
adopt a broader denition of ~'ij which averages over the product of preference shifters and
productivities. For example, we have shown earlier that exit brings about large welfare losses
if the exiting rms have a high market share. Here, we merely add that this could be because
the exiting rms are particularly productive or because their products are of particularly high
quality. This result echoes a well-known isomorphism between productivity and quality in
Melitz (2003) type environments.
3 Application
3.1 Data
We now use our methodology to decompose the welfare e¤ects of CUSFTA on the Canadian
economy. CUSFTA was a free trade agreement between Canada and the US which was
signed on January 2, 1988. It mandated annual reductions in tari¤s and other trade barriers
over a ten-year implementation period starting on January 1, 1989 which were accompanied
by a signicant increase in bilateral trade. In particular, the average tari¤ imposed against
manufacturing imports among the CUSFTA partners fell from over 8% to below 2% in Canada
and from 4% to below 1% in the US and bilateral manufacturing trade roughly doubled in
nominal terms.12
CUSFTA can be viewed as a natural experiment which makes it ideal for isolating the
e¤ects of trade liberalization. In particular, it was not accompanied by other macroeconomic
reforms or implemented in response to a macroeconomic crisis unlike many trade liberaliza-
tions in developing countries. Also, it was hard to anticipate since it faced strong political
12There were four categories of goods for which di¤erent phase-ins applied: Category A, goods for which all
tari¤s were eliminated on January 1, 1989; Category B: goods for which tari¤s were eliminated in ve annual
steps until January 1, 1993; Category C, goods for which tari¤s were eliminated in ten annual steps until
January 1, 1998; Category D, goods for which tari¤s were already eliminated before CUSFTA. See Figure 1 in
Treer (2004) for an illustration of the time series of tari¤ cuts.
17
opposition in Canada which was only overcome in a general election on November 21, 1988.
As a result, we feel comfortable interpreting our measured welfare e¤ects as gains from trade
resulting from CUSFTA but would also like to reiterate that our welfare decomposition is
valid regardless of what shock hits the economy.
To implement our methodology, we need information on domestic sales in Canada and
exports to Canada before and after CUSFTA came into force broken down into sales by
continuing rms, exiting rms, and entering rms. In order to separately identify variety
gains and productivity gains, we also need these sales broken down into their extensive and
intensive margins which essentially means that we need to know the respective number of
rms. As we now explain in more detail, we use micro data from Canada and the US. The
US is by far the most important trading partner of Canada accounting for on average 70% of
its manufacturing imports during our sample period.
Our Canadian data come from an annual survey of manufacturing establishments which
was initially called Census of Manufactures and is now known as Annual Survey of Manufac-
tures. It covers all but the very smallest Canadian manufacturing establishments currently
requiring an annual value of shipments of only $30,000 or more. Notice that an accurate
representation of small rms is very important for our purposes since we are particularly
interested in entering and exiting rms.13 We do not have direct access to this condential
data and rely on special tabulations provided to us by Statistics Canada when calculating our
Canadian estimates.
We have information on the counts and domestic shipments of all, all entering, and all
exiting establishments in 1978, 1988, and 1996 at the 2-digit Canadian SIC level. We dene an
entering establishment as an establishment which was not in the database in the previous year
for which we have data, that is in 1978 or 1988. Similarly, we dene an exiting establishment
as an establishment which was not in the database in the subsequent year for which we have
data, that is in 1988 or 1996. Hence, in any time period, establishments can always be
separated into entering and continuing ones with respect to the previous time period and
13Baldwin et al (2002) discuss how the entry and exit rates obtained from the Annual Survey of Manufactures
compare to the ones obtained from the Business Register or the Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program.
They document that they correlate much more highly if long di¤erences are considered which is comforting
because we will focus on time spans of 8-10 years.
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exiting and continuing ones with respect to the subsequent time period.
We choose the years 1978, 1988, and 1996 to construct our Canadian summary statistics
because those are the years for which Statistics Canada o¢ cials were most condent in the
sampling frame, resulting in the most reliable decomposition of the establishment population
into entering, continuing, and exiting establishments.14 Despite this precaution, there are
still some discrepancies in the reported counts of continuing establishments in adjacent time
periods. We correct this, by rst adjusting the shares of establishments that are reported
to exit until the next period and then recalculating their average revenues so that the total
revenues remain unchanged.15
Our US data come from the Census of Manufactures which is available every ve years.
Unfortunately, this census only contains information on exports starting in 1987 so that we
restrict attention to the 1987 and 1997 census years leaving us without direct information
on US pre-trends. Moreover, exports are not reported by destination so that we have to
calculate the su¢ cient statistics we need using more aggregated data.16 We use data on the
counts of new, continuing, and exiting exporters as well as their average revenues from export
shipments which we match to the 2-digit Canadian SIC level using a concordance available
from the website of the University of Toronto library.17
In our baseline calculations, we use the total number of new, continuing, and exiting US
exporters as a proxy for the number of new, continuing, and exiting US exporters to Canada
and proceed analogously with the corresponding total and average export revenues. As should
be clear from our decompositions (2) and (3), this yields unbiased estimates of the associated
welfare e¤ects in simple di¤erences as long as the establishment count, total revenue, and
14For example, it is well-known that small rms were undercounted in the Annual Survey of Manufactures
in the early 1990s due to budget cuts (Baldwin et al, 2002). As we mentioned in the previous footnote, taking
long di¤erences also reduces the likelihood of measurement error.
15 In particular, it should be true that Mcjj = M
c0
jj by denition but we usually observe small deviations
from this such that Mcjj > M
c0
jj . We correct this by setting M
c
jj equal to M
c0
jj and ~rjj equal to
Mcjj
Mc
0
jj
~rjj so that
total revenues remain unchanged. We adopt this procedure since random sample attrition is the most likely
explanation for the discrepancy.
16While Canadian customs collects transaction-level data on imports from the US, it is only available from
1992 onwards and also cannot be reliably matched to US rms. In an e¤ort to save resources, US customs does
not separately collect transaction-level data on exports to Canada.
17Notice that we could also compute the e¤ects of selection on the average productivity of US exporters by
comparing the average domestic revenues of continuing US exporters to the average domestic revenues of all
US exporters. We have experimented with this alternative approach and obtained very similar results just as
predicted by our theory.
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average revenue shares of continuing exporters to all destinations are representative of the
establishment count, total revenue, and average revenue shares of continuing exporters to
Canada.
Since it is hard to reliably verify the accuracy of this restriction, we interpret our simple-
di¤erences results with caution and refer also to our di¤erences-in-di¤erences approach. In
this approach, we compare the most and least liberalized Canadian industries so that the
treatment e¤ect is accurately measured as long as the error in the restriction di¤erences out.
For example, if there was a trend towards entering into exporting to another market which
was uncorrelated with Canadian tari¤ cuts, then this trend would drop out when we take
cross-industry di¤erences so that the di¤erential e¤ect of US exports in the most liberalized
industries would still be correctly accounted for.
In addition, we also corroborate our US results using trade data instead of micro data by
dening a US variety as a Schedule B industry code as is commonly done in the literature
(see, for example, Broda and Weinstein 2006). It turns out that the su¢ cient statistic based
on equation (2) is remarkably similar whether it is calculated from micro data or trade data
which gives us some condence in using the trade data to see if US exports to Canada had any
major pre-trends. However, the trade data become an unreliable guide when calculating the
more detailed decomposition (3) so that we use the micro data as our benchmark throughout
the analysis.18
We also need estimates of the elasticities of substitution for our calculations and we use
the ones from Obereld and Raval (2014). They are estimated using the 1987 US Census
of Manufactures exploiting the condition that markups should equal = (   1). They are
available from Table VII of their online appendix and we again used the concordance from
Peter Schotts website to match them to 2-digit Canadian SIC codes. The matched elasticities
range from 3.3 to 4.4 and average to 3.7 which is within the range of alternative estimates in
the literature. Whenever we report results using aggregate data, we simply work with this
average elasticity of 3.7.
18This is likely the result of having many more rms in the micro data than products in the trade data.
The micro data likely capture substantial rm entry within schedule B product categories that were already
exported to Canada before CUSFTA, while the trade data capture a smaller number of "new export" products
that have higher export revenues in part because previously exporting rms as well as newly exporting rms
entered in those categories.
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3.2 Aggregate results
3.2.1 Su¢ cient statistics
We now present the su¢ cient statistics needed to calculate the "new" gains from CUSFTA
on the Canadian economy. Recall that CUSFTA came into force on January 2, 1989 and
mandated annual tari¤ reductions over a 10-year implementation period. Given the years
for which we have micro data, we therefore take 1988-1996 to be our "CUSFTA" period for
Canada and 1987-1997 to be our "CUSFTA" period for the US which we use to track the
e¤ects of CUSFTA on the Canadian economy. In addition, we also construct a "pre-trend"
period for Canada ranging from 1978-1988 in order to see if our Canadian micro data is
subject to any signicant pre-trends.
Table 1 starts by presenting the su¢ cient statistics needed to calculate the "new" gains
from CUSFTA using equation (2). Panel A focuses on exiting, continuing, and entering
Canadian rms and summarizes what share of the domestic market they captured among all
Canadian rms at the beginning and end of our pre-trend and CUSFTA periods. By denition,
the market shares of exiting and continuing rms always sum to 100% at the beginning of
a period (rms will exit or not by the end of the period) and the market shares of entering
and continuing rms always sum of to 100% at the end of a period (rms have entered or not
since the beginning of the period).
As can be seen, these market shares moved just like one would expect given that CUSFTA
exposed Canadian rms to tougher competition in the Canadian market by reducing the trade
barriers faced by US rms. In particular, the market share of exiting Canadian rms far
exceeded the market share of entering Canadian rms in the CUSFTA period resulting in a
sharp rise in the market share of continuing Canadian rms. In contrast, such a sharp rise
was not observed in the pre-trend period in which the market share of exiting Canadian rms
was much more similar to the market share of entering Canadian rms even though there was
still a slight pre-trend in the same direction.
Panel B turns to entering, continuing, and exiting US rms following the same logic as
Panel A. Entry is now dened as entry into exporting and the market shares are the export
market shares of entering US exporters among all US exporters and so on. Just like the
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domestic market shares of Canadian rms, the export market shares of US exporters also
adjusted exactly as one would expect following CUSFTA given that it made exporting more
attractive for US rms. In particular, the market share of exiting US exporters was smaller
than the market share of entering US exporters in the CUSFTA period resulting in a fall in
the market share of continuing US exporters.
While we do not have micro data on US exporters before 1987, we can still get a sense of
the pre-trends from the trade data following an approach which is widely used in the literature
(see, for example, Broda and Weinstein 2006). In particular, we can simply think of a variety
as a disaggregated product category in the trade data and then treat each product category
like we would treat an exporting plant in the micro data. We do this at the Schedule B
level focusing on exports from the US to Canada. For the CUSFTA period, this requires a
crosswalk between HS codes and Schedule B codes that we construct using publicly available
concordances.19
We rst verify that the numbers in Panel B of Table 1 for the CUSFTA period would
have been similar had we used trade data instead of micro data and then use the trade data
to look at the pre-trend period. In particular, the market share of continuing US exporters
was 61.8% in 1987 and 61.4% in 1997 according to the trade data which is very close to the
64.5% in 1987 and 61.3% in 1997 obtained using the micro data. Moreover, the market share
of continuing US exporters was 88.2% in 1978 and 87.0% in 1987 which suggests that US
entry into exporting to Canada and US exit out of exporting to Canada was not subject to
any major trends before 1987.20
Tables 2 and 3 explore Table 1 further providing the statistics needed to decompose the
"new" welfare e¤ects following formula (3). In particular, they separate the sales ratios from
Table 1 into the corresponding ratios of rm counts (Table 2) and the corresponding ratios
19All trade data is from the Center for International Data at UC Davis. The Schedule B codes were replaced
by HS codes in 1989 which were subsequently revised in 1996. We rst link the HS codes before and after
1996 using the concordance of Pierce and Schott (2012) and then map this all into Schedule B codes using
a concordance available from the Center for International Data at UC Davis. The Schedule B codes are
substantially more aggregated than the HS codes so we treat all HS codes which cannot be matched to Schedule
B codes as new varieties.
20The results look similar if we look at US exports to all destinations mimicking what we do in the micro
data. Then, the market shares of continuing US exporters are 80.8% in 1978 and 82.0% in 1987 for the pre-
trend period, and 66.1% in 1987 and 65.0% in 1997 for the CUSFTA period. We have also experimented with
state-level trade data which allows us to dene US varieties as state-product pairs instead of country-product
pairs and obtained very similar results.
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of average sales (Table 3) so that the entries in Table 1 are simply the product of the entries
in Table 2 and Table 3. For example, the domestic market share of continuing Canadian
rms was 75.6% in 1978 because 48.3% of Canadian rms were continuing rms, the average
revenues of continuing rms were equal to 156.5% of the average revenues of all Canadian
rms, and 75:6% = 48:3%  156:5%.
Table 2 reveals the extensive margin patterns which are underlying the market shares
presented in Table 1. Most obviously, it shows that there was a lot of entry and exit among
Canadian rms and US exporters with entering and exiting rms accounting for an average
56.2% of all rms. Moreover, it indicates that the number of Canadian rms dropped in the
CUSFTA period despite a sharp upward trend in the pre-trend period while the number of
US exporters grew dramatically in the CUSFTA period. This can also be seen directly from
the total counts of Canadian rms and US exporters which are shown in parentheses in Table
2.21
Table 3 complements this by turning to the intensive margin patterns which are underlying
the market shares presented in Table 1. As can be seen, continuing rms were much larger than
exiting or entering rms which implies that they were also much more productive according
to the model we use. While this mechanically implies that exit increases average productivity
due to selection and entry decreases average productivity due to selection, we can say more
about the net e¤ects of selection by interpreting the revenue shares in Table 3 through the
lens of our earlier mapping from average revenues to average productivities, ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
=
1
 1

ln
~rcij
~rij
  ln ~r
c0
ij
~r0ij

.22
Specically, the negative e¤ect of entry on average productivity always dominated the
positive e¤ect of exit on average productivity among Canadian and US rms. While the net
21The sharp rise in the number of Canadian rms in the pre-trend period is also documented in alternative
datasets. For example, Gu et al (2003) nd a similar trend using data from the Longitudinal Employment
Analysis Program which is available starting in 1983. While we are not aware of any systematic study analyzing
the causes of this trend, it correlates with declining unemployment, declining interest rates, and immigration
reforms that allowed for "business class" immigration for the rst time.
22As one would expect, we cannot plausibly use the trade data to infer what Tables 2 and 3 might have
looked liked if we had micro data for US exporters in the pre-trend period since it fails to capture the massive
churning we see in the micro data during the CUSFTA period. For example, the trade data suggests that only
33.8% of all US rms in 1987 exit out of exporting until 1997 whereas the micro data shows that it is actually
54.7%. However, we know from the micro data that the total number of US manufacturing establishments
only grew slightly during our sample period (from 317,000 in 1977 to 346,000 in 1987 and then to 361,000 in
1997) which also suggests that there was probably no major pre-CUSFTA trend.
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selection e¤ect was minimal for Canadian rms in the CUSFTA period, it was strikingly large
for Canadian rms in the pre-trend period and US exporters in the CUSFTA period. Using
the average Obereld and Raval (2014) elasticity of  = 3:7 for our calculations, the net e¤ect
of selection on average productivity was -0.4% among Canadian rms in the CUSFTA period,
-12.8% among Canadian rms in the pre-trend period, and -17.1% among US exporters in the
CUSFTA period.
While the adjustments in the number of Canadian rms, the number of US rms, and
the average productivity of US exporters following CUSFTA were therefore exactly as one
would expect, the nding that selection implied a slight decrease in the average productivity
of Canadian rms is quite surprising at rst. However, it is important to note that there is
a strong pre-trend in the data and that selection still increased the average productivity of
Canadian rms relative to this pre-trend. In any case, we will also nd positive e¤ects of
selection on Canadian productivity in our later di¤erences-in-di¤erences specications so that
this surprising result will not hold up.
3.2.2 Gains from trade
Table 4 puts all the pieces together and nally calculates the "new" gains from CUSFTA on
the Canadian economy. Panels A and B rst show the welfare e¤ects of entry and exit by
Canadian rms and US exporters respectively, following formula (3). Panel C then turns to
the combined e¤ect by aggregating across countries to generate net "new" variety gains and
"new" productivity gains, following formula (1). Panel D nally accounts for nontraded and
intermediate goods by applying Canadas manufacturing expenditure share j and its share
of value added in gross production j as explained above. All values are annualized for better
comparability and we again set  = 3:7 throughout.23
Looking only at the CUSFTA period, we nd that the overall "new" gains from CUSFTA
were negative for Canada. Not adjusting for nontraded and intermediate goods, Canadas real
23As one would expect, Canadian consumers spend more on Canadian goods than on US goods so that the
Canadian e¤ects matter more for the overall "new" gains from trade. In particular, the Sato-Vartia weights
are 79.3% and 20.7% in the pre-trend period and 70.7% and 29.3% in the CUSFTA period, with the larger
value always representing the weight on domestic goods. We use j = 0:32 and j = 0:50 which are averages
of Canadas manufacturing expenditure share and share of value added in gross production yielding an overall
adjustment coe¢ cient of
j
j
= 0:64.
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income increased by 0.20% per year due to "new" variety gains but decreased by a -0.54%
per year due to "new" productivity losses resulting in negative "new" gains from trade of
-0.34% per year. Underlying this are positive net variety e¤ects of 1.90% per year combined
with negative net productivity e¤ects of -1.71% per year resulting from the net entry of US
exporters as well as negative net variety e¤ects of -0.50% and negative net productivity e¤ects
of -0.05% resulting from the net exit of Canadian rms.
Canadas overall "new" gains from CUSFTA increase to -0.23% when we take simple
di¤erences thereby controlling for the pre-trend in Canada. We set all US pre-CUSFTA e¤ects
to 0.00% in these calculations since we do not have any US pre-CUSFTA data and the available
evidence suggests that there were no major US pre-trends.24 While the overall welfare e¤ect
is similar with or without taking di¤erences, the net variety gains and net productivity gains
switch signs. In particular, the variety gains become negative while the productivity gains
become positive since Canada experienced substantial net entry of underperforming rms in
the pre-CUSFTA period.
While these "new" welfare losses are quite large in absolute terms, they are small relative
to the "traditional" gains which we compute as a residual following the approach explained
in section 2.3. Focusing again on the CUSFTA period, we estimate the "traditional" gains
from CUSFTA on the Canadian economy to be 0.89% per year which includes all terms from
the "traditional" gains expression in formula (1) except for domestic within-rm productivity
e¤ects. This is much larger than the negative -0.34% per year "new" gains from CUSFTA
and implies that CUSFTA after all had a sizeable positive overall e¤ect on Canadian welfare
amounting to 0.55% per year.
These numbers for the "traditional" gains are calculated using our baseline model with
iceberg trade barriers but do not change much if Canadas tari¤ revenue losses are taken into
account. In particular, the share of tari¤ revenues in Canadas total spending dropped from
0.69% in 1988 to 0.18% in 1996 so that the adjustment term ln
1+

Rj
wjLj
0
1+

Rj
wjLj
 derived in the
appendix amounts only to -0.06% in annualized terms. This implies that the "traditional"
24Recall that our analysis of disaggregated trade data suggested that US exports to Canada were not subject
to any major trend in the pre-CUSFTA period. Recall also that the total number of US rms (i.e. exporters
and non-exporters) stays fairly constant over time.
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gains fall from 0.89% to 0.83% per year if Canadas tari¤ revenue losses are taken into account.
Recall that we allocate the adjustment term to the "traditional" gains so that the "new" gains
remain unchanged.
Table 4 also allows us to revisit some of our earlier conceptual points. In particular, we
proved earlier that gaining varieties is always good and losing varieties is always bad in our
generic heterogeneous rm environment regardless of the associated productivity e¤ects. This
is reected by the fact that the individual variety gains always dominate the associated pro-
ductivity losses and the individual variety losses always dominate the associated productivity
gains. Moreover, we argued that this is necessarily true only for the gross e¤ects but not
for the net e¤ects, an example of which is the dominating e¤ect of net productivity over net
variety in the pre-trend period.
As a result, inferring welfare gains from observed productivity increases is more problem-
atic than it might seem. This can be illustrated most clearly with reference to the "Di¤erence"
column in Panel A of Table 4 which controls for the pre-CUSFTA trend. As can be seen, the
average productivity of Canadian rms increased by 1.22% per year due to selection following
CUSFTA relative to the pre-CUSFTA trend. While it is tempting to interpret this as a sure
sign of welfare gains, it is actually indicative of underlying net exit which brings about a
-0.42% per year net welfare loss since the 1.22% per year productivity gain is overturned by
a -1.64% per year variety loss.
Similarly, Table 4 also conrms our earlier conjecture that partial calculations can yield
grossly mismeasured estimates of the "new" gains from trade. In particular, Canadas 1.90%
per year net variety gain from the larger number of US exporters is almost entirely o¤set by
its -0.50% per year net variety loss from the lower number of domestic rms once both are
appropriately weighted leaving Canada with only a 0.20% per year net variety gain. Also,
the -0.05% per year productivity loss from domestic selection is made much worse by the
-1.71% per year productivity loss from foreign selection implying an overall -0.54% per year
net productivity loss again after taking the appropriate weights into account.
While imports from the US account for the vast majority of Canadian imports, one might
still be concerned that our results are a¤ected by third-country e¤ects. To address this issue,
we turn again to highly disaggregated trade data which allows us to look at imports from all
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countries and not just from the US. We nd that the "new" gains from trade are -0.31% per
year when we include all countries and -0.37% per year when we include only the US which
suggests that there were only small third-country e¤ects. These numbers do not adjust for
nontraded goods, intermediate goods, or pre-trends and are quite close to the corresponding
-0.34% we obtained using US micro data and reported in Panel C of Table 4.25
As we explained above, our "new" gains are not exactly the same as the gains captured
by the Feenstra-Ratio which is commonly used to adjust for new varieties when calculating
changes in CES price indices. However, the "new" gains from trade reaped by Canada as a
result of CUSFTA would still be negative if this alternative measure was used. In particular,
the "new" losses would then amount to -0.22% instead of -0.34% per year, again not adjusting
for nontraded goods, intermediate goods, or pre-trends. Recall that the di¤erence captures
traditional forces acting on new varieties which we assign to the "traditional" gains such as
the direct price-reducing e¤ects of tari¤ cuts.
3.2.3 Micro versus macro approach
Table 5 contrasts the net welfare e¤ects presented in Table 4 with the net welfare e¤ects one
would obtain if one did not rely on our general framework but instead applied the special
case of Melitz (2003) with Pareto distributed productivities considered by Arkolakis et al
(2008). In the appendix, we show that changes in the number of rms and their average
productivity then depend on changes in trade shares through the relationships ln
M 0ij
Mij
= ln
0ij
ij
and ln
~'0ij
~'ij
 ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
=  1 ln
0ij
ij
, where  is the Pareto shape parameter, all under the assumption
that the size of the labor force, the xed cost of entry, and the xed cost of accessing domestic
and foreign markets remain unchanged.
In order to mimic the results we would obtain if we did not have any micro data, we
calculate the net variety and net productivity e¤ects indirectly from the observed changes in
trade shares. However, we leverage our micro data to obtain an estimate of the Pareto shape
parameter  which we need for these calculations. In particular, we show in the appendix
25Since these calculations do not include pre-trends, we work with trade data at the HS-10 level instead of
the Schedule B level. We have again experimented with state-level US trade data and obtained very similar
results.
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. Comparing US exporters to all US
rms at the beginning and end of the CUSFTA period, we nd  = 2:91 which is within the
range of existing estimates in the literature.
Table 5 does not present a full decomposition following equation (3) but simply reports
the "new" variety gains and "new" productivity gains along the lines of formula (1). One
di¤erence from Table 4 is that the domestic and foreign components are now already weighted
by the appropriate ij so that they immediately sum up to the combined e¤ects. The values
under "Baseline" essentially present the same information as Table 4 while the values under
"Melitz-Pareto" report the results obtained from the model of Arkolakis et al (2008). As we
explained earlier, the "new" variety and "new" productivity gains then exactly cancel so that
there are no "new" gains from trade.
As can be seen, the restricted model does a good job of capturing the negative selection
e¤ects on US exporters but is much less successful with respect to all other margins determin-
ing the "new" gains from trade. Of course, this is not a coincidence since we have calibrated
the Pareto shape parameter using data on US entry into exporting. As a general rule, the
restricted model fares better in the specication taking pre-CUSFTA trends into account but
even then it fails to approximate the "new" variety gains and "new" productivity gains from
trade. Overall, we nd that the restricted model substantially overestimates the "new" gains
from trade.
3.3 Industry-level results
3.3.1 Multi-industry extension
We now turn to an analysis of the e¤ects of CUSFTA on the Canadian economy at the
industry-level with two main goals in mind. First, we would like to check how sensitive our
baseline results are to the level of aggregation thereby addressing concerns about aggregation
bias which have been raised in the recent literature on the measurement of the gains from
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trade.26 Second, we would like to explore the e¤ects of CUSFTA in a di¤erences-in-di¤erences
setting comparing the most strongly and the least strongly liberalized industries in order to
deal with the possibility that our baseline results also reect macroeconomic shocks other
than the trade liberalization brought about by CUSFTA.27
Our analysis is guided by a multi-industry extension of our baseline methodology. In
particular, we now assume that our earlier setup applies industry-by-industry allowing for
industries to di¤er in terms of all model variables and parameters other than wages reecting
free labor mobility within countries between industries. As a result, changes in the ideal indus-
try price indices can be decomposed just like our ideal aggregate price indices earlier, yielding
ln
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where s now indexes industries. To be clear, ijs are now dened over industry expenditure
shares ijs =
Xijs
Yjs
exactly analogous to the aggregate weights we considered before.
Assuming a nested-CES structure, we now aggregate over these ideal industry price in-
dices in a similar way. In particular, we dene the ideal aggregate price index to be a
CES aggregate over the ideal industry price indices with an upper-level elasticity " so that
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Combining this yields our multi-industry version of equation (1),
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26Ossa (2015), for example, shows that the gains from trade are typically much larger in multi-industry
specications since imports in the "average" industry matter much less than imports in "critical" industries
which are essential for the functioning of the economy.
27Recall that this is purely an issue of interpretation since our decomposition is valid regardless of what
shocks hit the economy.
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Essentially, all this extended formula says is that we can rst apply our baseline formula
at the industry level and then aggregate across industries using the weights js. This implies
that the welfare e¤ects we discussed earlier now apply at the industry level and it is easy to
show that they can also be measured in the same way. In particular, equations (2) and (3) now
become 1s 1 ln

Xcijs=Xijs
Xc
0
ijs=X
0
ijs

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from exit and entry which we now summarize as
1
s   1 ln
 
Xcijs=Xijs
Xc
0
ijs=X
0
ijs
!
| {z }
overall "new" gains
=
1
s   1 ln
M 0ijs
Mijs| {z }
net variety gains
+
1
s   1
 
ln
~rcijs
~rijs
  ln ~r
c0
ijs
~r0ijs
!
| {z }
net productivity gains
(5)
In the above discussion, we implicitly assumed that trade liberalization does not change
the number of industries and all countries always supply goods from all industries. This
makes sense for our particular application since CUSFTA did not have any extensive margin
e¤ects at the industry-level dened by 2-digit Canadian SIC codes. However, we show in
the appendix that our methodology can easily be extended to also incorporate industry-level
extensive margin e¤ects. In particular, one can use changes in the market shares of continuing
sectors and continuing suppliers to quantify the welfare e¤ects of industry-level selection using
variations of equations (4) and (5).
This extended methodology then also comprehensively captures any Ricardian gains from
inter-industry trade. As should be clear, all resource reallocations from less to more productive
continuing industries show up as terms-of-trade e¤ects in the "traditional" gains (which is also
captured in decomposition 4).28 Moreover, any additional resource reallocations arising as a
result of countries selecting into or out of particular industries appear as an additional term
in the "traditional" gains (which is not captured in decomposition 4 but in appendix equation
9). Notice that our multi-industry model features Ricardian comparative advantage because
it allows for cross-country and cross-industry variation in productivity.
28The logic is exactly the same as for resource reallocations from less to more productive continuing rms. In
particular, they do not change the purchasing power of domestic wages in terms of domestic goods since rms
charge constant markups over marginal costs. Hence, they can only change the purchasing power of domestic
wages in terms of foreign goods which happens only if they a¤ect domestic wages relative to foreign wages.
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As should be easy to verify, our earlier extensions also generalize naturally to the multi-
industry case. In particular, non-traded and intermediate goods can be introduced by scaling
all welfare e¤ects by the factor
j
j
, endogenous markups and heterogeneous quality can be
accommodated by appropriately reinterpreting the term
PN
i=1
ijs

ln
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  ln ~'
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
, tari¤
revenue can be accounted for by adding the term ln
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wjLj
0
1+

Rj
wjLj
 , and multi-product rms can be
featured by separating varieties into an additional CES nest. This also applies to the extended
multi-industry model from the appendix so that it would even be feasible to simultaneously
incorporate industry-level, rm-level, and product-level selection e¤ects.
3.3.2 Multi-industry results
We begin by exploring whether our baseline results are subject to aggregation bias by com-
paring the gains from trade computed by applying formula (1) and (3) using aggregate data
to the gains from trade computed by applying formula (4) and (5) using industry-level data.
The results are summarized in Table 6 which follows exactly the same format as Table 5. In
particular, we again show our aggregate results and then compare them to their industry-
level equivalents, each time applying the appropriate Sato-Vartia weights. As can be seen,
our ndings are similar when using industry-level data with the combined overall "new" gains
being almost unchanged.29
There are two main reasons why we do not nd any aggregation bias in contrast to Ossa
(2015). First, we work at the 2-digit level and our elasticity estimates do not vary much at
that level of disaggregation ranging only between 3.3 and 4.4. Ossas (2015) point is that only
a few critical (i.e. low-elasticity) industries are needed to generate large gains from trade and
that such critical industries can typically only be identied at high levels of disaggregation.
Second, we only consider relatively small tari¤ changes instead of the full gains of moving from
autarky to current levels of trade so that the access countries have to particular industries
does not change that much anyway.
29To be clear, the results under "Aggregate, w/o pre-trend" report ijyij , where ij are the Sato-Vartia
weights from formula (1) and yij are the variety, productivity, or overall gains computed for the CUSFTA
period using formula (3). Analogously, the results under "Industry, w/o pre-trend" report
P
s js
ijsyijs,
where js and ijs are the Sato-Vartia weights from formula (4) and yijs are the variety, productivity, or
overall gains computed for the CUSFTA period using formula (4). The results with pre-trends report the
di¤erence between the statistics calculated for the CUSFTA and pre-trend periods.
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We then exploit cross-industry variation in tari¤ cuts to assess if our baseline results are
indeed driven by CUSFTA. In our calculations, we mainly rely on the tari¤ cut measures
constructed by Treer (2004) which give the changes in the bilateral tari¤s between Canada
and the US following CUSFTA net of the changes in the respective most-favored nation (MFN)
tari¤s. The motivation for considering such changes in bilateral tari¤ preferences instead of
simple bilateral tari¤ cuts is that Canadian and US MFN tari¤s also changed somewhat as
a result of the Uruguay Round Agreement which came into force in 1994 towards the end of
our CUSFTA period.30
Before we discuss our formal results, it is instructive to rst look at some simple corre-
lations calculated over our CUSFTA period. Figure 1 plots the industry-level su¢ cient sta-
tistic for Canadas overall "new" gains from domestic entry and exit, ln

Xcjjs=Xjjs
Xc
0
jjs=X
0
jjs

, against
changes in Canadas tari¤ preferences granted to the US, ln 
CAN0
s
CANs
, abstracting for now from
the elasticity of substitution adjustment 1s 1 in order to plot only data. As can be seen, the
gure exhibits a strong positive correlation which suggests that the Canadian welfare losses
from domestic exit dominate the Canadian welfare gains from domestic entry more in more
strongly liberalized industries.
Figures 2 and 3 then break up these overall "new" gains from domestic entry and exit
into net variety gains and net productivity gains by considering changes in domestic variety,
ln
M 0jjs
Mjjs
, and changes in domestic average productivity, ln
~rcjj
~rjj
  ln ~r
c0
jj
~r0jj
, following decomposition
(5). While there is a clear positive correlation in Figure 2 implying that the number of
domestic varieties falls more in more strongly liberalized industries, the correlation between
tari¤ cuts and average productivity changes is only weakly negative. This already indicates
that selection e¤ects only induced small changes in Canadian average productivity which we
will conrm more formally below.
Figures 4-6 contain the analogous plots for US exporters, showing how the corresponding
overall "new" gains, net variety gains, and net productivity gains correlate with changes in
Canadas tari¤ preferences granted to the US. Figure 4 exhibits a negative correlation which
30We thank Treer for sharing his tari¤ measures with us. They are originally at the 4-digit level and we
aggregate them to the 2-digit level using Canadian imports from the US as weights. We drop the transport
equipment industry in all our industry-level calculations because it was already exempted from MFN prior to
CUSFTA as a result of the Canada-US Auto Pact (see Treer, 2004).
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suggests that the overall welfare gains from US entry into exporting dominate the overall
welfare losses from US exit out of exporting more in more strongly liberalized industries.
Figures 5 and 6 reveal that this negative correlation is again mainly driven by variety instead
of productivity e¤ects but overall Canadian tari¤ cuts clearly have a weaker impact on US
exporters than on domestic Canadian rms.
Figures 7-10 explore the domestic welfare e¤ects further by looking at exit and entry
separately. In particular, Figures 7 and 8 show the exit and entry e¤ects underlying the net
entry results plotted in Figure 1 using an industry-level version of our earlier decomposition
(3). Interestingly, the net e¤ects are driven much more by exit than entry which is further
explored in Figures 9 and 10. Figure 9 shows that the gross variety losses are even more
strongly related to Canadian tari¤ cuts than the net variety losses depicted in Figure 2. Also,
Figure 10 now shows a clear relationship between Canadian tari¤ cuts and productivity gains
when only the exiting rms are taken into account.
Against this background, we now turn to our di¤erences-in-di¤erences analysis adopting
a exible regression approach following Treer (2004). The basic idea is to estimate the
"new" welfare e¤ects of CUSFTA by rst regressing our industry-level su¢ cient statistics
from formula (5) on industry-level tari¤ cuts and then evaluating the estimated equations
at observed tari¤ cuts disregarding the constant which soaks up any common trends. While
this is not a classic di¤erences-in-di¤erences specication in the sense of comparing treatment
industries to control industries, it still identies the e¤ects of CUSFTA only from cross-
industry variation in tari¤ cuts.31
We report our results in Table 7 where we again also include our baseline numbers
as a reference. In specication 2, we run industry-level regressions of the form yijs =
0 + 1
CAN
s + ijs for our CUSFTA period and then calculate treatment e¤ects fromP
s js
ijs^1
CAN
s , where yijs are the net variety gains, net productivity gains, and over-
all gains from formula (5), CANs are the log-changes in Canadian tari¤ preferences granted
to the US, js and ijs are the Sato-Vartia weights from equation (4), and ^1 is the estimated
31As can be seen from the abovementioned gures, the rubber industry experienced virtually no tari¤ cuts
so that our regression results essentially show the e¤ects of CUSFTA relative to this industry. Just like Treer
(2004), we cannot completely rule out that it was also a¤ected by CUSFTA through general equilibrium forces
or other (omitted) variables which would then show up in the constant term.
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slope coe¢ cient of the regression line. Essentially, we rst calculate the predicted yijs for
all industries and then average over them using Sato-Vartia weights.
In specication 3, we then estimate yijs = 0+1
CAN
s +2
US
s +3
CAN;MEX
s +
ijs for domestic e¤ects and yijs = 0+1
CAN
s +2
US
s +3
MEX;US
s +ijs for foreign
e¤ects and report
P
s js
ijs

^1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s + ^2
US
s

, where the new variables are log-changes
in US tari¤ preferences granted to Canada (USs ), Canadian tari¤ preferences granted to
Mexico (CAN;MEXs ), and Mexican tari¤ preferences granted to the US (
MEX;US
s ). We
also include CAN;MEXs and 
MEX;US
s as controls in our regressions since NAFTA also
came into force in 1994. Specication 4 simply extends specication 3 by further di¤erencing
the Canadian dependent variables with respect to their pre-CUSFTA trends.32
As can be seen from Panel C of Table 7, all three di¤erences-in-di¤erences specica-
tions corroborate our earlier result that the combined "new" gains from CUSFTA on the
Canadian economy are negative because Canada loses more from the exit of domestic rms
out of production than it gains from the entry of US rms into exporting taking variety
e¤ects and productivity e¤ects into account. Moreover, these "new" welfare losses remain
economically signicant in all three specications bearing in mind that they are reported in
annualized terms. For example, specication 2 implies a total (unadjusted) real income loss
of 8  ( 0:19%) =  1:52% over our 8-year CUSFTA period.
While the di¤erences-in-di¤erences results therefore broadly conrm our earlier conclu-
sions, they also allow us to make some additional points. In particular, Panel A of Table 7
shows that the foreign variety gains fall sharply in our di¤erences-in-di¤erences specications.
Moreover, Panel B of Table 7 highlights that the productivity e¤ects due to domestic selection
become positive in our di¤erences-in-di¤erences specications. This suggests that the large
US entry into exporting and the small decrease in domestic Canadian productivity measured
in our baseline specication are largely driven by aggregate shocks which cannot be attributed
to CUSFTA.
32Our measures of Canadian tari¤ preferences granted to Mexico are aggregated from information on average
duties at the HS-10 level which we obtain from the University of Toronto library. We construct the Mexican
tari¤ preferences granted to the US from Kowalczyk and Davis (1998). We do not include ^3
CAN;MEX
s
or ^3
MEX;CAN
s when calculating the average treatment e¤ects because we are interested in the average
treatment e¤ect of CUSFTA in which Mexico is not involved. Recall that we only have data on the pre-
CUSFTA period for Canada so that we cannot control for pre-CUSFTA trends when we estimate the US
e¤ects.
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Having said this, our domestic productivity results are quite close to zero which seems at
odds with what Treer (2004) nds.33 However, Treer (2004) also reports that the average
employment of all rms grows about as fast as the average employment of continuing rms,
~l0jjs
~ljjs
 ~l
c0
jjs
~lcjjs
, when analyzing the employment e¤ects of CUSFTA. When interpreted through
the lens of our model, this immediately implies that ln
~'0jjs
~'jjs
 ln ~'
c0
jjs
~'cjjs
 0 from formula (5) since
ln
~rcjjs
~rjjs
  ln ~r
c0
jjs
~r0jjs
= ln
~lcjjs
~ljjs
  ln ~l
c0
jjs
~l0jjs
given that average revenues are proportional to the average
wage bill. Hence, our conclusion di¤ers from Treers (2004) not because we have di¤erent
ndings but because our model tells us to interpret them di¤erently.
Essentially, our measurement of rm productivity di¤ers from Treers (2004) in funda-
mental ways. In particular, we adopt rm revenue as a size-based measure of rm produc-
tivity and calculate the e¤ects of selection on average productivity by comparing the average
revenues of continuing rms and all rms. This works because relative rm revenues are
log-proportional to relative rm productivities in our model since all other determinants of
rm revenues drop out. Treer (2004) instead calculates rm productivity by deating nomi-
nal value added per worker with producer price indices which is inconsistent with the Melitz
(2003) model our decomposition is based on.
To see this, take the standard Melitz (2003) model and consider as an example a non-
exporting Canadian rm. Using the average price ~pjjs as a producer price deator, it should
be easy to verify that the statistic calculated by Treer (2004) is pjjs(')qjjs(')~pjjsljjs(') = ~'jjs
lvjjs(')
lvjjs(')+fjs
,
where employment is split into a xed and a variable part, ljjs (') = fjs + lvjjs ('). As can
be seen, this statistic only measures a function of rm productivity but not rm productivity
itself so that additional steps would have to be taken to accurately recover rm productivity.
Moreover, it relies critically on taking the models xed cost assumption literally because
otherwise value added per worker would be the same across rms.34
33We emphasize here the di¤erences between our results and Treers (2004) because it is the most prominent
study on CUSFTA to date. However, we should add that other papers on the productivity e¤ects of CUSFTA
already challenge Treers estimates. For example, Lileeva (2008) reports that selection among Canadian plants
negatively a¤ected Canadian productivity which she attributes to substantial exit among large Canadian plants
that were only serving the Canadian market.
34For our purposes, an important additional drawback of using real value added per worker is that it also takes
into account resource reallocations from less to more productive continuing rms such as from non-exporters
to exporters when it is computed at the industry-level. As we explained earlier, such resource reallocations
are only welfare relevant to the extent that they change the terms-of-trade of the country and should therefore
not be included in our measure of the "new" gains. Notice that this issue also somewhat confounds the
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It is worth contemplating what economic forces might explain our domestic productivity
result. One possibility is that xed costs are heterogeneous so that the most protable rms
which survive trade liberalization are not necessarily the most productive ones. A more elab-
orate story is that the theoretical link between trade liberalization and average productivity
does not extend to multi-industry settings in which more complex general equilibrium forces
are at play. Along these lines, Segerstrom and Sugita (2015) have recently shown that domes-
tic productivity should actually fall in more deeply liberalized industries in a multi-industry
Melitz (2003) model contrary to what is commonly thought.
Tables 8-10 report all regression results underlying the di¤erences-in-di¤erences calcula-
tions shown in Table 7. Table 8 e¤ectively just puts numbers on the correlations shown
in Figures 1-6 now also taking into account heterogeneity in 1s 1 . As the gures suggest,
Canadas tari¤ cuts against the US are signicantly related to Canadas variety gains and
overall "new" gains but not to Canadas productivity gains. The main message from Tables
9 and 10 is that US tari¤ cuts against Canada and Mexican tari¤ cuts against the US are not
signicantly related to any of our su¢ cient statistics which is not too surprising since we are
measuring the e¤ects of CUSFTA on the Canadian economy.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we measured the "new" gains from trade reaped by Canada as a result of CUS-
FTA. We thought of the "new" gains from trade of a country as all welfare e¤ects pertaining
to changes in the set of rms serving that country as emphasized in the "new" trade literature.
To this end, we rst developed an exact decomposition of the gains from trade based on a
general heterogeneous rm model which allowed us to account for "traditional" and "new"
gains using simple su¢ cient statistics. We then applied this decomposition using Canadian
and US micro data and found that the "new" welfare e¤ects of CUSFTA on Canada were
negative.
abovementioned link between our productivity results and Treers (2004) employment results because our
theory would strictly speaking suggest to look only at the variable employment devoted to producing goods
for the domestic market not taking export activities into account. Indeed, this is precisely why we focus on
the domestic revenues instead of the total revenues of Canadian rms in our application so that we perform
our calculations in a fully theory-consistent way.
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Given the usual narrative that trade liberalization expands import variety and improves
domestic productivity, how is it possible that we nd negative "new" gains from trade? The
narrow answer is simply that import variety gains are counteracted by domestic variety losses,
and domestic productivity gains are counteracted by import productivity losses, which all
have to be taken into consideration for an accurate measurement of the "new" gains from
trade. Essentially, trade liberalization brings about mirroring selection e¤ects among domestic
producers and foreign exporters and focusing only on import variety and domestic productivity
gains amounts to cherry-picking only the positive parts.
But taking this logic one step further, the broader point is that there are gains from
foreign entry into exporting and losses from domestic exit out of production which can add
up to positive or negative "new" welfare e¤ects. The magnitudes of these gains and losses
depend on the combined domestic market shares of a¤ected rms which, in turn, depend on
the number of rms a¤ected and their average productivities. An implication of this is that
the productivity e¤ects only have an attenuating character and do not overturn the underlying
variety e¤ects. For example, losing a low productivity rm is still harmful, just less harmful
than losing a high productivity one.
Let us close with a reminder that our nding of negative "new" gains from CUSFTA does
not imply that CUSFTA actually left Canada worse o¤. On the contrary, the "traditional"
gains far outweighed the "new" welfare losses according to our calculations so that Canada
actually reaped substantial gains from trade. Moreover, our measure of the "new" gains from
trade accounts only for selection e¤ects and did not include any within-rm productivity
e¤ects which we instead ascribed to the "traditional" gains from trade. Earlier work such as
Treer (2004) has found that within-rm productivity also increased as a result of CUSFTA
and we have nothing to add to this debate.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Special case of Arkolakis et al (2008)
This appendix presents a version of Melitz (2003) considered by Arkolakis et al (2008) and
derives the associated expressions mentioned in the main text. This is a special case of our
model because it imposes a specic entry process and assumes Pareto distributed productiv-
ities. In particular, entrants into country i have to hire fei units of labor in country i before
drawing their productivities, where fei is a xed cost of entry. Moreover, entrants into country
i wishing to serve market j have to hire fij unit of labor in country j, where fij is a xed
market access costs. Firms draw their productivities from Gi (') = 1  

Ai
'

, where Ai is
the Pareto location parameter, and  is the Pareto shape parameter.
A country i rm then only exports to country j if its productivity exceeds 'ij which is im-
plicitly dened by rij

'ij

= wjfij so that ~rij =

~'ij
'ij
 1
wjfij and ij =Mij

~'ij
'ij
 1 fij
Lj
.
Upon noticing that ~'ij =


 +1
 1
 1
'ij under Pareto and holding constant fij and Li, this
implies ln0ij  lnij = ln
M 0ij
Mij
so that
PN
i=1
ij ln
M 0ij
Mij
= 0, as claimed in the main text. Impos-
ing free entry, it is easy to show thatMij =

Ai
'ij

Li

 1f
e
i
so that also
PN
i=1
ij

ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln A0iAi

=
0 if fei does not change, which is what was claimed in the main text since now
A0i
Ai
=
~'c0ij
~'cij
. The
same equations and restrictions also immediately yield the other relationships mentioned in
the main text, i.e.  =  
ln
M0ij
Mij
 ln M
0
ii
Mii
ln
~'0
ij
~'ij
 ln ~'
0
ii
~'ii
, ln
M 0ij
Mij
= ln
0ij
ij
, and ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
=  1 ln
0ij
ij
.
5.2 Nontraded and intermediate goods
This appendix elaborates on the nontraded and intermediate goods extension described in the
main text. In particular, we assume that consumers spend a share 1  j of their income on
nontraded goods so that the aggregate price index becomes Pj =

P Tj
j 
PNj
1 j
, where
P Tj and P
N
j are the price indices of traded and nontraded goods. Moreover, we suppose
that rms spend a fraction 1   j of their costs on intermediates using the same variety
aggregator as consumers so that input costs are given by cj = (wj)
j (Pj)
1 j . Finally, we
impose that nontraded goods are produced under constant returns and perfect competition
with productivity 'Nj so that P
N
j =
cj
'Nj
.
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Per-capita welfare is then still proportional to real wages given our earlier assumption
that nal expenditure is proportional to labor income, Wj / wjPj . Solving cj = (wj)
j (Pj)
1 j
for wj and substituting yields Wj /

cj
Pj
 1
j which can be further manipulated to Wj /
cj
PTj
j
j

'Nj
 1 j
j upon substituting Pj =

P Tj
j 
PNj
1 j
and PNj =
cj
'Nj
. Abstract-
ing from productivity changes in the nontraded sector for simplicity, this implies ln
W 0j
Wj
=
 jj ln
PT
0
j
PTj
if cj is chosen as the numeraire. Given that P Tj now corresponds to Pj from the
earlier model, ln
PT
0
j
PTj
can now be decomposed in a perfectly analogous fashion yielding an
extended version of formula (1):
ln
W 0j
Wj
=
j
j
NX
i=1
ij
 
  ln 
0
ij
 ij
+

ln
c0j
cj
  ln c
0
i
ci

+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
!
| {z }
"traditional" gains from trade
(6)
+
j
j
NX
i=1
ij
 
1
   1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
+
 
ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij
!!
| {z }
"new" gains from trade
To understand the robustness of this simple roundabout specication, it is helpful to
explore how it generalizes to arbitrary rm-level input-output structures. In particular, sup-
pose that the intermediate goods price index of rm ' in country j is given by P Ij (') =PN
i=1
R
'02Iij(') pij ('
0)1  dG

'0j'0 2 Iij (')
 1
1 
, where Iij (') is the subset of rms
from country i supplying intermediate goods to rm ' in country j. Maintaining our earlier
assumption that rms spend a fraction 1 i of their costs on intermediates, this implies that
the input costs of rm ' in country i can be written as ci (') = (wi)
i
 
P Ii (')
1 i which
yields the pricing formula pij (') =  1
ci(') ij
' .
Using the roundabout input costs ci = (wi)
i (Pi)
1 i as a benchmark, we can expand
the pricing formula to pij (') =  1
ci ij
ci
ci(')
'
and again express aggregate trade ows as Xij =
Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj and average prices as ~pij =  1
ci
~'ij
. However, we now have to use a gener-
alized notion of average productivity ~'ij =
R
'2ij

ci
ci(')
'
 1
dGi ('j' 2 ij)
 1
 1
which
is dened over adjusted productivity levels cici(')' thereby taking deviations in the access to
intermediate goods from the roundabout benchmark into account. Conditional on this gener-
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alization, our su¢ cient statistic (2) and decomposition (6) remain completely unchanged, as
should be easy to verify.
The interpretation of this is that our original su¢ cient statistic (2) still accurately mea-
sures the direct e¤ects of selection on consumer welfare by calculating the average productivity
changes associated with entry and exit using the adjusted rm productivities cici(')'. However,
our original decomposition (6) now provides an oversimplied accounting of the indirect prop-
agation of these e¤ects through the input-output structure by merely scaling all direct e¤ects
by 1j . This results in an error which becomes part of the change in the average productivity
of continuing rms ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
which we anyway do not attempt to measure and subsume under
the "traditional" gains.
This can be seen most clearly by writing the expression for ~'cij in changes which yields
~'c
0
ij
~'cij
=
 R
'02c0ij
rij(')
~rcij

P 0i=Pi
P I
0
i ('
0)=P Ii (')
(1 i)( 1) 
'0
'
 1
dG0i

'0j'0 2 c0ij
! 1 1
and shows that
the growth rate of ~'cij now also depends on the growth rate of P
I
i (') relative to Pi. For exam-
ple, if continuing rms were more likely to self-select into importing, trade liberalization would
make their price index fall by more than the roundabout specication suggests, which would
then show up as an increase in their average productivity. Without rm-level input-output
data which would permit a direct estimation of P
I0
i ('
0)
P Ii (')
following our methodology, this could
be explored further by making functional form assumptions on the relationship Iij (').
5.3 Endogenous markups
This appendix elaborates on the endogenous markup extension described in the main text.
In particular, we assume that there is a discrete number of rms instead of a continuum
of rms so that each rm takes the price index e¤ects of its pricing decisions into account.
As should be easy to verify, the pricing formula then becomes pij (') =
"ij(')
"ij(') 1
wi ij
' , where
"ij (') =    pij(')qij(')Yj (   1) is the demand elasticity faced by a rm with productivity '
from country i in country j. Intuitively, more productive rms then charge higher markups
because consumers respond less to their price increases because these price increases also
imply larger price index increases due to these rmslarger market shares.
Our methodology is robust to this modication in the sense that it only requires a reinter-
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pretation of the average productivity term. To see this, notice that we can simply rewrite the
pricing formula as pij (') =  1
wi ij
="ij(')
( 1)=("ij(') 1)
'
so that the model with endogenous markups
looks like a model with constant markups and scaled productivities. In particular, it should be
clear that we can still write Xij /Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj , ~pij / wi ij~'ij , and Yj / wjLj just using the
modied denition of average productivity ~'ij =
P
'2ij

="ij(')
( 1)=("ij(') 1)'
 1
gi ('j' 2 ij)
 1
 1
,
where gi ('j' 2 ij) is now the fraction of country i rms with productivity ' serving country
j.
5.4 Tari¤ revenue
This appendix explores the e¤ects of allowing for tari¤ revenue. We relabel the iceberg trade
costs as ij and introduce ad valorem tari¤s tij such that  ij = 1 + tij . Thinking of Xij
and ~pij as values gross of the tari¤, tari¤ revenues can be written as Rj =
PN
i=1
tij
 ij
Xij
and our three key equations become Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj
1 
Yj , ~pij /  1
wiij ij
~'ij
, and Yj /
wjLj + Rj . Just as before, we can now dene the import shares ij =
Xij
Yj
and write
ln
P 0j
Pj
=
PN
i=1
ij

ln
 0ij
 ij
+ ln
w0i
wi
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

 PNi=1 ij  1 1 ln M 0ijMij + ln ~'0ij~'ij   ln ~'c0ij~'cij . How-
ever, we now have to impose ln (Yj=Lj)
0
(Yj=Lj)
= ln
w0j
wj
+ ln
1+

Rj
wjLj
0
1+

Rj
wjLj
 so that our welfare decompo-
sition becomes,
ln
W 0j
Wj
=
NX
i=1
ij
 
  ln 
0
ij
 ij
+

ln
w0j
wj
  ln w
0
i
wi

+ ln
~'c0ij
~'cij
!
+ ln
1 +

Rj
wjLj
0
1 +

Rj
wjLj

| {z }
"traditional" gains from trade (incl. tari¤ revenue)
(7)
+
NX
i=1
ij
 
1
   1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
+
 
ln
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  ln ~'
c0
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| {z }
"new: gains from trade
5.5 Multi-product rms
This appendix elaborates on the multi-product rm extension described in the main text. We
maintain our earlier assumption that utility is a CES aggregate over a continuum of varieties
indexed by ! with an elasticity of substitution  so that the aggregate price indices are given
by Pj =
PN
i=1
R
!2
ij p
1 
ij! d!
 1
1 
. We add that each variety is a CES aggregate over a
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continuum of products indexed by  with the same elasticity of substitution  so that the
prices pij! are also price indices given by pij! =
R
2ij! p
1 
ij!d
 1
1 
. To be clear, each rm
makes one variety, 
ij is the set of varieties from country i available in country j, and ij!
is the set of products contained in variety ! 2 
ij .
It should be clear that changes in the aggregate price indices can then still be decomposed
into ln
P 0j
Pj
=
PN
i=1
ij

ln
 0ij
 ij
+ ln
w0i
wi
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

 PNi=1 ij  1 1 ln M 0ijMij + ln ~'0ij~'ij   ln ~'c0ij~'cij  and
measured using 1 1 ln

Xcij=Xij
Xc
0
ij =X
0
ij

= 1 1 ln
M 0ij
Mij
+

ln
~'0ij
~'ij
  ln ~'
c0
ij
~'cij

. Moreover, one can show
that changes in the average productivity of continuing rms can then be further decom-
posed into ln
~'c
0
ij
~'cij
=
R
!2
cij

c
ij! ln
~'c0ij!
~'cij!
d! +
R
!2
cij

c
ij!

1
 1 ln
K0ij!
Kij!
+

ln
~'0ij!
~'ij!
  ln ~'
c0
ij!
~'cij!

d!
and measured using 1 1 ln

Xcij!=Xij!
Xc
0
ij!=X
0
ij!

= 1 1 ln

K0ij!
Kij!

+

ln
~'0ij!
~'ij!
  ln ~'
c0
ij!
~'cij!

, where cij! =

c0
ij! cij!
ln
c0
ij!
 lnc
ij!R
!2
c
ij

c0
ij!
 c
ij!
ln
c0
ij!
 lnc
ij!
d!
and cij! =
xij!R
!2
c
ij
xij!d!
. This then implies the following extended welfare
decomposition:
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"traditional" gains
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product-level "new" gains
To be clear,
M 0ij
Mij
still captures changes in the number of rms while
K0ij!
Kij!
now captures
changes in the number of products . Similarly, ln
~'0ij
~'ij
still captures changes in average produc-
tivity across rms while ln
~'0ij!
~'ij!
now captures changes in the average productivity across prod-
ucts. In particular, ~'ij! =

1
Kij!
R
2ij! '
 1
i! d
 1
 1
and ~'cij! =

1
Kcij!
R
2cij! '
 1
i! d
 1
 1
which are just cross-product analogs to the cross-rm expressions from before. Also, ~'ij = 
1
Mij
R
!2
ij

K
1
 1
ij! ~'ij!
 1
d!
! 1
 1
and ~'cij =
 
1
Mcij
R
!2
cij

K
1
 1
ij! ~'ij!
 1
d!
! 1
 1
which
are now aggregates over the rm-level productivities K
1
 1
ij! ~'ij!. Detailed derivations of these
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and all other expressions from this appendix are available upon request.
5.6 Industry-level extensive margin e¤ects
This appendix elaborates on how we allow for industry-level extensive margin adjustments
in our multi-industry extension as mentioned in the main text. At the aggregate level, we
now assume that consumers in country j have access to varieties from Sj industries so that
the aggregate price indices become Pj =
P
s2Sj P
1 "
js
 1
1 "
. At the industry-level, we now
assume that Njs countries supply industry s varieties to country j so that we can write Pjs =P
i2Njs P
1 s
ijs
 1
1 s and Pijs =
R
!2
ijs p
1 s
ijs! d!
 1
1 s , where 
ijs is the set of industry s
varieties from country i available in country j. Notice that we have separated the original Pjs
from the main text into a new Pjs and a new Pijs which will be useful below.
Changes in the aggregate price index can then be decomposed into ln
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. More-
over, changes in the average productivity of continuing industries can then be decomposed into
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. Together, this then implies the extended welfare decomposition:
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"new" gains from trade
This formula collapses to equation (4) in the main text if all industries are continuing
industries, Sj = Scj , and all suppliers are continuing suppliers, N
c
js = Njs. The rst additional
term labelled "traditional industry-level selection" captures the welfare e¤ects of changes in
the set of industries consumers in country j have access to. The second additional term
labelled "traditional supplier-level selection" captures the welfare e¤ects of changes in the set
of countries supplying industry s varieties to country j. While both these terms could appear
in a general Ricardian model, the most common versions assume Sj = Scj and emphasize
supplier-level selection e¤ects.
To be clear, the averages are now de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tinuing rms, suppliers, and industries. Moreover, cjs and 
c
ijs are Sato-Vartia weights de-
ned over market shares of continuing industries, cjs =
YjsP
s2Sc
j
Yjs
, and continuing suppliers,
cijs =
XijsP
i2Nc
j
Xijs
. Detailed derivations of these and all other expressions from this appendix
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are available upon request.
5.7 Heterogeneous quality
This appendix elaborates on how we allow for heterogeneous quality. We introduce prefer-
ence shifters ij! into the utility functions such that the demand functions become qij! =
 1ij!
p ij!
P 1 j
Yj . Firms producing higher quality varieties then sell more but still charge constant
markups over marginal costs since the demand elasticity remains unchanged. Bilateral trade
ows can then still be written as Xij = Mij


 1
wi ij
~'ij
1
Pj
1 
Yj using the broadened den-
ition ~'ij =

1
Mij
R
!2
ij (ij!'!)
 1 d!
 1
 1
which now averages over preference shifters and
productivities. As a result, we then still have (i) Xij / Mij

~pij
Pj

, (ii) ~pij / wi ij~'ij , and (iii)
Yj / wjLj so that all results from the main text generalize accordingly.
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Exit Cont. Cont. Enter Exit Cont. Cont. Enter
24.4% 75.6% 78.4% 21.6% 28.0% 72.0% 81.2% 18.8%
Exit Cont. Cont. Entry
35.5% 64.5% 61.3% 38.7%
B: Market shares of US exporters
A: Market shares of Canadian plants
Notes: Panel A shows the domestic market shares of entering, continuing, and exiting Canadian plants among all
Canadian plants. Panel B shows the export market shares of entering, continuing, and exiting US exporters among
all US exporters.
CUSFTA
1987 1997
1996
TABLE 1: OVERALL MARKET SHARES
1978 1988
Pre-trend CUSFTA
1988
Exit Cont. Cont. Enter Exit Cont. Cont. Enter
51.7% 48.3% 35.5% 64.5% 49.6% 50.4% 56.2% 43.8%
Exit Cont. Cont. Entry
54.7% 45.3% 27.1% 72.9%
(38,000 plants) (34,000 plants)
B: Shares of US exporters
CUSFTA
Notes: Panel A shows the fraction of entering, continuing, and exiting Canadian plants among all Canadian plants.
Panel B shows the fraction of entering, continuing, and exiting US exporters among all US exporters. The numbers
in parentheses give the total number of active plants or exporters rounded to the nearest 1,000. 
1987 1997
(29,000 plants) (48,000 plants)
(28,000 plants) (38,000 plants)
TABLE 2: EXTENSIVE MARGINS OF MARKET SHARES
A: Shares of Canadian plants
Pre-trend CUSFTA
1978 1988 1988 1996
Exit Cont. Cont. Enter Exit Cont. Cont. Enter
47.2% 156.5% 220.7% 33.4% 56.5% 142.7% 144.4% 43.0%
Exit Cont. Cont. Enter
64.9% 142.4% 225.9% 53.1%
Notes: Panel A shows the average domestic sales of entering, continuing, and exiting Canadian plants as a share
of the average domestic sales of all Canadian plants. Panel B shows the average foreign sales of entering,
continuing, and exiting US exporters as a share of the average foreign sales of all US exporters. The numbers in
parentheses give the implied average productivity growth rates due to selection assuming σ=3.7. 
(-17.1% productivity loss)
(-12.8% productivity loss)
TABLE 3: INTENSIVE MARGINS OF MARKET SHARES
A: Relative sizes of Canadian plants
B: Relative sizes of US exporters
CUSFTA
1987 1997
Pre-trend CUSFTA
1978 1988 1988 1996
(-0.4% productivity loss)
Pre-trend CUSFTA Difference
Net welfare effect -0.14% -0.56% -0.42%
Net variety effect 1.14% -0.50% -1.64%
Net productivity effect -1.28% -0.05% 1.22%
Welfare loss from exit -1.04% -1.52% -0.49%
Variety loss -2.69% -3.17% -0.47%
Productivity gain 1.66% 1.65% -0.01%
Welfare gain from entry 0.90% 0.96% 0.07%
Variety gain 3.83% 2.66% -1.17%
Productivity loss -2.93% -1.70% 1.23%
CUSFTA Difference
Net welfare effect 0.19% 0.19%
Net variety effect 1.90% 1.90%
Net productivity effect -1.71% -1.71%
Welfare loss from exit -1.62% -1.62%
Variety loss -2.93% -2.93%
Productivity gain 1.31% 1.31%
Welfare gain from entry 1.81% 1.81%
Variety gain 4.83% 4.83%
Productivity loss -3.02% -3.02%
Pre-trend CUSFTA Difference
"New" gains from trade -0.11% -0.34% -0.23%
"New" variety gains 0.90% 0.20% -0.70%
"New" productivity gains -1.01% -0.54% 0.47%
Pre-trend CUSFTA Difference
"New" gains from trade -0.07% -0.22% -0.15%
"New" variety gains 0.58% 0.13% -0.45%
"New" productivity gains -0.65% -0.34% 0.30%
A: Annualized welfare effects of domestic entry and exit (Canadian plants)
B: Annualized welfare effects of foreign entry and exit (US exporters)
C: Annualized overall welfare effects of entry and exit
TABLE 4: "NEW" GAINS FROM CUSFTA OF CANADA
Notes: This table decomposes the "new" gains from CUSFTA on the Canadian economy. Panel A shows the
unweighted welfare effects arising from the entry and exit of Canadian plants calculated using formula (3).
Panel B shows the unweighted welfare effects arising from the entry and exit of US exporters calculated
using formula (3). Panel C applies formula (1) and averages between the values from Panels A and B using
the Sato-Vartia weights to obtain the overall welfare effects of CUSFTA on the Canadian economy. Panel D
further accounts for nontraded and intermediate goods following formula (4). All values are reported in
annualized terms by taking simple averages and assume σ=3.7.
D: Adjusted annualized overall welfare effects of entry and exit (μ,η≠1)
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.36% -1.26% -0.78% -0.73%
Foreign (weighted) 0.56% 0.56% 0.78% 0.73%
Combined 0.20% -0.70% 0.00% 0.00%
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.04% 0.97% 0.73% 0.68%
Foreign (weighted) -0.50% -0.50% -0.73% -0.68%
Combined -0.54% 0.47% 0.00% 0.00%
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.39% -0.28% -0.05% -0.05%
Foreign (weighted) 0.06% 0.06% 0.05% 0.05%
Combined -0.34% -0.23% 0.00% 0.00%
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.25% -0.18% -0.04% -0.03%
Foreign (weighted) 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03%
Combined -0.22% -0.15% 0.00% 0.00%
Baseline Melitz-Pareto
TABLE 5: BASELINE MODEL VERSUS MELITZ-PARETO SPECIAL CASE
Notes: This table compares the "new" gains from CUSFTA from Table 4 which are calculated using formula (1) (under "Baseline") to
the "new" gains from CUSFTA obtained from the Melitz (2003) model used by Arkolakis et al (2008) which is a special case of ours
(under "Melitz-Pareto"). All welfare effects are given in annualized terms, are weighted by their corresponding Sato-Vartia weights,
and assume σ=3.7. The entries under "w/o pre-trend" look at the post-CUSFTA period and the entries under w/ pre-trend look at the
difference between the post-CUSFTA and the pre-CUSFTA period. Panel D adjusts for nontraded and intermediate goods following
formula (4). 
Baseline Melitz-Pareto
Baseline Melitz-Pareto
A: Annualized "new" variety gains
B: Annualized "new" productivity gains
C: Annualized overall "new" gains
D: Adjusted annualized overall "new" gains (μ,η≠1)
Baseline Melitz-Pareto
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.36% -1.26% -0.25% -0.85%
Foreign (weighted) 0.56% 0.56% 0.44% 0.44%
Combined 0.20% -0.70% 0.20% -0.41%
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.04% 0.97% -0.12% 0.57%
Foreign (weighted) -0.50% -0.50% -0.40% -0.40%
Combined -0.54% 0.47% -0.52% 0.17%
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.39% -0.28% -0.36% -0.28%
Foreign (weighted) 0.06% 0.06% 0.04% 0.04%
Combined -0.34% -0.23% -0.33% -0.24%
w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend w/o pre-trend w/ pre trend
Domestic (weighted) -0.25% -0.18% -0.23% -0.18%
Foreign (weighted) 0.04% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02%
Combined -0.22% -0.15% -0.21% -0.16%
A: Annualized "new" variety gains
TABLE 6: BASELINE MODEL VERSUS INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES
B: Annualized "new" productivity gains
C: Annualized overall "new" gains
Notes: This table compares the "new" gains from CUSFTA from Table 4 which are calculated from formula (1) using aggregate data
(under "Baseline") to the "new" gains from CUSFTA calculated from formula (5) using industry-level data (under "Industry"). All
welfare effects are given in annualized terms and are weighted by their corresponding Sato-Vartia weights. The aggregate results
assume σ=3.7 while the industry-level result impose the Oberfield and Raval (2014) elasticities. The entries under "w/o pre-trend"
look at the post-CUSFTA period and the entries under "w/ pre-trend" look at the difference between the post-CUSFTA and the pre-
CUSFTA period. Panel D adjusts for nontraded and intermediate goods following formulas (4) and (7). 
Baseline Industry
Baseline Industry
Baseline Industry
D: Adjusted annualized overall "new" gains (μ,η≠1)
Baseline Industry
(1) Baseline (2) Diff-in-diff, CAN 
tariffs only
(3) Diff-in-diff, full 
CUSFTA
(4) Diff-in-diff, full 
CUSFTA w/ pre-
trends
Domestic (weighted) -0.36% -0.26% -0.32% -0.27%
Foreign (weighted) 0.56% 0.05% 0.02% 0.02%
Combined 0.20% -0.21% -0.30% -0.26%
(1) Baseline (2) Regression, 
CAN tariffs only
(3) Regression, full 
CUSFTA
(4) Regression, full 
CUSFTA w/ pre-
trends
Domestic (weighted) -0.04% 0.04% 0.09% 0.07%
Foreign (weighted) -0.50% -0.02% 0.00% 0.00%
Combined -0.54% 0.02% 0.10% 0.07%
(1) Baseline (2) Regression, 
CAN tariffs only
(3) Regression, full 
CUSFTA
(4) Regression, full 
CUSFTA w/ pre-
trends
Domestic (weighted) -0.39% -0.22% -0.22% -0.20%
Foreign (weighted) 0.06% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02%
Combined -0.34% -0.19% -0.20% -0.18%
(1) Baseline (2) Regression, 
CAN tariffs only
(3) Regression, full 
CUSFTA
(4) Regression, full 
CUSFTA w/ pre-
trends
Domestic (weighted) -0.25% -0.14% -0.14% -0.13%
Foreign (weighted) 0.04% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01%
Combined -0.22% -0.12% -0.13% -0.12%
TABLE 7: BASELINE MODEL VS. INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES
A: Annualized "new" variety gains
Notes: This table compares the "new" gains from CUSFTA from Table 4 which are calculated from formula (1) by taking differences
using aggregate data (specification 1) to the "new" gains from CUSFTA calculated from formula (5) by running differences-in-
differences regressions using industry-level data exploiting cross-industry variation in tariff cuts (specifications 2-4). All welfare effects
are given in annualized terms, are weighted by their corresponding Sato-Vartia weights, and use the Oberfield and Raval (2014)
elasticities. Panel D adjusts for nontraded and intermediate goods following formulas (4) and (7). The regressions results underlying
the effects calculated for specifications 2-4 can be found in Tables 8-10.
B: Annualized "new" productivity gains
C: Annualized overall "new" gains
D: Adjusted annualized overall "new" gains (μ,η≠1)
domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign
1.090*** -1.056** -0.161 0.376 0.929*** -0.680**
(0.260) (0.381) (0.213) (0.318) (0.222) (0.316)
  constant -0.110 1.507*** -0.454*** -1.004*** -0.563*** 0.503**
(0.172) (0.252) (0.141) (0.210) (0.147) (0.209)
  observations 21 21 21 21 21 21
  R2 0.481 0.288 0.029 0.069 0.481 0.196
Notes: This table shows the regression results underlying the welfare effects reported in Table 7, specification 2. Standard errors are given in parentheses and ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
TABLE 8: REGRESSION RESULTS UNDERLYING TABLE 7, SPECIFICATION 2 
"new" variety gains "new" productivity gains overall "new" gains
1
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠?̅?𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑀�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠?̅?𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑀�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
 
domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign
1.171*** -1.285** -0.221 0.501 0.950** -0.784*
(0.392) (0.505) (0.285) (0.434) (0.358) (0.447)
0.317 1.204 -0.348 -0.736 -0.031 0.468
(0.699) (0.978) (0.509) (0.840) (0.639) (0.866)
-0.079 0.027 -0.052
(0.178) (0.129) (0.162)
-0.056 0.041 -0.016
(0.056) (0.048) (0.050)
  constant 0.027 1.076 -0.616*** -0.680 -0.589*** 0.397
(0.198) (0.630) (0.144) (0.541) (0.181) (0.558)
  observations 20 21 20 21 20 21
  R2 0.556 0.390 0.155 0.152 0.452 0.216
Notes: This table shows the regression results underlying the welfare effects reported in Table 7, specification 3. Standard errors are given in parentheses and ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
TABLE 9: REGRESSION RESULTS UNDERLYING TABLE 7, SPECIFICATION 3 
overall "new" gains"new" productivity gains"new" variety gains
1
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠?̅?𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑀�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠?̅?𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑀�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign
1.329** -1.285** -0.120 0.501 1.209*** -0.784*
(0.594) (0.505) (0.393) (0.434) (0.368) (0.447)
-0.371 1.204 -0.335 -0.736 -0.706 0.468
(1.059) (0.978) (0.700) (0.840) (0.655) (0.866)
-0.694** 0.472** -0.222
(0.269) (0.178) (0.167)
-0.056 0.041 -0.016
(0.056) (0.048) (0.050)
  constant -1.172*** 1.076 0.538** -0.680 -0.633*** 0.397
(0.301) (0.630) (0.199) (0.541) (0.186) (0.558)
  observations 20 21 20 21 20 21
  R2 0.360 0.390 0.353 0.152 0.440 0.216
TABLE 10: REGRESSION RESULTS UNDERLYING TABLE 7, SPECIFICATION 4 
Notes: This table shows the regression results underlying the welfare effects reported in Table 7, specification 4. Standard errors are given in parentheses and ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
"new" variety gains "new" productivity gains overall "new" gains
Δ
1
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄  Δ 1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠?̅?𝑟𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑀�𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀,𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
 
Δ
1
𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠?̅?𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 ?̅?𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑀�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠 𝑋𝑋𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠⁄  1𝜎𝜎𝑠𝑠 − 1 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑠𝑠  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙
𝜏𝜏𝑀𝑠𝑠
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶.𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  
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Figure 1: Overall domestic "new" gains from CUSFTA
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Figure 2: Domestic net variety gains from CUSFTA
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 3: Domestic net productivity gains from CUSFTA
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 4: Overall foreign "new" gains from CUSFTA
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 5: Foreign net variety gains from CUSFTA
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 6: Foreign net productivity gains from CUSFTA
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 7: Overall domestic "new" gains from CUSFTA - exit only
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 8: Overall domestic "new" gains from CUSFTA - entry only
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 9: Domestic net variety gains from CUSFTA - exit only
Annualized tariff changes in %
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Figure 10: Domestic net productivity gains from CUSFTA - exit only
Annualized tariff changes in %
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